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Abstract
We build a model studying the effect of an economy’s potential for social learning
on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Provided consumers are forwardlooking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we show how quantitative
and qualitative features of the learning environment affect observed adoption dynamics, welfare, and the speed of learning. Our analysis has two main implications. First,
we identify environments that are subject to a saturation effect, whereby increased
opportunities for social learning can slow down adoption and learning and do not increase consumer welfare, possibly even being harmful. Second, we show how differences
in the learning environment translate into observable differences in adoption dynamics, suggesting a purely informational channel for two commonly documented adoption
patterns—S-shaped and concave curves.
JEL codes: D81, D83, O33
Keywords: Innovation adoption; social learning; informational free-riding; strategic
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Introduction

Suppose a new product of uncertain quality, such as a novel medical procedure or a new
movie, is released into the market. In recent years, the rise of internet-based review sites, retail platforms, search engines, video-sharing websites, and social networking sites has greatly
∗
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increased the potential for social learning in the economy: If a patient suffers a serious complication or a movie-goer has a positive viewing experience, this is more likely than ever to
find its way into the public domain; and there are more and more people who have access to
this common pool of consumer-generated information.
This paper builds a model studying the effect of an economy’s potential for social learning
on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. We analyze how consumers’ informational incentives depend on quantitative and qualitative features of the learning environment,
and how this affects observed adoption dynamics, welfare, and the speed of learning. Our
analysis has two main implications. First, quantitatively, we suggest caution in evaluating
the impact of increases in the potential for social learning: We identify environments that
are subject to a saturation effect, whereby beyond a certain level, increased opportunities
for social learning can slow down adoption and learning and do not improve consumer welfare, possibly even being harmful. Second, at a qualitative level, we show how differences in
the learning environment translate into observable differences in adoption dynamics: This
implies a new, purely informational channel for two of the most commonly documented
adoption patterns—S-shaped and concave curves.
A central ingredient of our model is that consumers are forward-looking social learners. In
choosing whether to adopt an innovation, forward-looking consumers recognize the option
value of waiting for more information. With social learning, this information is created
endogenously, based on the consumption experiences of other adopters. Equilibrium adoption
dynamics must then resolve the following tension: If too many consumers adopt at any given
time, then the expected amount of future information might be so great that all consumers
would in fact strictly prefer to wait; conversely, if too few consumers adopt, it might not be
worthwhile for anyone to wait. This tension depends non-trivially on the ease and nature of
information transmission and is the source of the results of the preceding paragraph.
Forward-looking social learning is well-documented empirically, notably in the development economics literature studying the adoption of agricultural and health innovations.1
However, its informational ramifications have largely remained unexplored theoretically: Existing learning-based models of innovation adoption typically assume either that learning is
1

Studies of social learning in this domain include Besley and Case (1993, 1994); Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995); Kremer and Miguel (2007); Conley and Udry (2010); Dupas (2014). There is also evidence for
forward-looking social learning: Bandiera and Rasul (2006) analyze the decision of farmers in Mozambique
to adopt a new crop, sunflower. They find that if a farmer’s network of friends and family contains many
adopters of the new crop, knowing one more adopter may make him less likely to initially adopt it himself.
Munshi (2004) compares farmers’ willingness to experiment with new high-yield varieties (HYV) across rice
and wheat growing areas in India. Farmers in rice growing regions, which compared with wheat growing
regions display greater heterogeneity in growing conditions that make learning from others’ experiences less
feasible, are found to be more likely to experiment with HYV than farmers in wheat growing areas.
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social but consumers are myopic (e.g., Young, 2009), or that consumers are forward-looking
but information arrives exogenously (e.g., Jensen, 1982). In either case, the dependence
on the learning environment is trivial, both quantitatively (a greater ease of information
transmission is always beneficial) and qualitatively (generating rich adoption patterns like
S-shaped curves requires additional forces such as specific forms of consumer heterogeneity).2
In our model (Section 2), an innovation of fixed, but uncertain quality (better or worse
than the status quo) is introduced to a large population of forward-looking consumers. In the
baseline setting, consumers are (ex ante) identical, sharing the same prior about the quality
of the innovation, the same discount rate, and the same tastes for good and bad quality.
At each instant in continuous time, consumers receive stochastic opportunities to adopt the
innovation. A consumer who receives an opportunity must choose whether to irreversibly
adopt the innovation or to delay his decision until the next opportunity. In equilibrium,
consumers optimally trade off the opportunity cost of delays against the benefit to learning
more about the quality of the innovation.
Learning is summarized by a public signal process, representing news that is obtained
endogenously—based on the experiences of previous adopters—and possibly also from exogenous sources, such as professional critics or government watchdog agencies. To study the
importance of quantitative and qualitative features of the news environment, we build on
the exponential-bandit framework widely used in the literature on strategic experimentation
(see Section 1.1): Individual adopters’ experiences generate public signals at a fixed Poisson rate that we use to quantify the potential for social learning. Qualitatively, there is a
natural distinction between bad news markets, where signal arrivals (breakdowns) indicate
bad quality and the absence of signals makes consumers more optimistic about the innovation; and good news markets, where signals (breakthroughs) suggest good quality and the
absence of signals makes consumers more pessimistic. As we discuss (see Section 2.2), this
distinction may reflect whether bad or good quality innovations are more likely to generate
“newsworthy” (e.g., extreme) payoff realizations, as well as limitations or reporting practices
of the available social learning systems.
Section 3 analyzes and contrasts equilibrium adoption dynamics in bad and good news
markets. As in many applications of Poisson learning, we focus on the stark but tractable case
of perfect bad (respectively, good) news, where a single signal arrival conclusively indicates
bad (respectively, good) quality. Thus, incentives are non-trivial only in the absence of
signals. We first derive a useful structural result, whereby equilibrium incentives over time
satisfy a quasi-single crossing property (Lemma 1): Absent signals, there can be at most
one transition from strict preference for adoption to strict preference for waiting, or vice
2

See the discussion in Section 1.1.
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versa, with a possible period of indifference in between. Building on this, Theorems 1 and
2 establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness under bad and good news.3 Equilibrium
adoption dynamics admit simple closed-form descriptions that are Markovian in current
beliefs and in the mass of consumers who have not yet adopted.
Under bad news, the unique equilibrium is characterized by two times 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ t∗2 : Until
t∗1 , no adoption takes place and consumers acquire information only from exogenous sources;
from t∗2 on, all consumers adopt immediately when given a chance (absent breakdowns).
If t∗1 < t∗2 , then throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 ) there is partial adoption: Only some consumers adopt
when given a chance, with others free-riding on the information generated by the adopters,
where the flow of adopters on (t∗1 , t∗2 ) ensures indifference between adopting and delaying
throughout this interval. Ceteris paribus, a period of partial adoption arises in economies
with a large enough potential for social learning and with sufficiently patient and not too
optimistic consumers, while otherwise there is no partial adoption. By contrast, under good
news, the equilibrium is all-or-nothing, featuring immediate adoption up to some time t∗ and
no adoption from t∗ on (absent breakthroughs). Thus, regardless of the potential for social
learning, consumers’ discount rate or prior beliefs, there is never any partial adoption.
This highlights a new distinction (absent in existing strategic experimentation models)
between the way in which bad and good news learning affects consumers’ incentives. During
a period where a consumer is prepared to adopt the innovation, he is willing to delay his
decision only if he expects to acquire decision-relevant information in the meantime: Since
originally he is prepared to adopt, such information must make him strictly prefer not to
adopt. Under bad news, breakdowns have this effect, as they reveal the innovation to be
bad. By contrast, under good news, breakthroughs conclusively reveal the innovation to be
good and hence cannot be decision-relevant to a consumer who is already willing to adopt.
Turning to implications of the equilibrium analysis, Section 4.1 considers adoption curves,
which plot the percentage of adopters in the population against time. Under bad news, the
adoption curve exhibits an “S-shaped” growth pattern whenever t∗1 < t∗2 : Absent breakdowns,
adoption levels increase convexly throughout the partial adoption region (t∗1 , t∗2 ), while growth
is concave from time t∗2 on (reflecting the gradual depletion of the population during the immediate adoption phase). Convex growth throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 ) is tied to consumer indifference
during this region: Absent breakdowns, consumers grow increasingly optimistic, and their
opportunity cost to delaying goes up. To maintain indifference, this is offset by an increase
in the flow of new adopters, which raises the odds that waiting will produce information
that allows consumers to avoid a bad innovation. By contrast, the all-or-nothing structure
of the good news equilibrium implies that adoption proceeds in (possibly multiple) “concave
3

Uniqueness is in terms of aggregate adoption behavior.
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bursts;” concave curves also arise in bad news markets with very optimistic and impatient
consumers or with little potential for social learning (in which case t∗1 = t∗2 ). S-curves are the
leading empirically documented adoption pattern, while concave curves are also commonly
observed.4 As we discuss in Section 1.1, our model complements existing explanations by
highlighting a purely informational channel that might contribute to these patterns.
Finally, Section 4.2 considers increases in the potential for social learning. Proposition 1
establishes the possibility of a saturation effect: If learning is via bad news and the equilibrium features partial adoption, then such increases are (ex ante) welfare-neutral, because
they are fully balanced out by an expansion of the period (t∗1 , t∗2 ) of informational free-riding.
As a result, greater opportunities for social learning also strictly slow down the adoption of
good products and do not translate into uniformly faster learning about the quality of the
innovation. In Section 4.3, we further build on this finding to show that, when consumers are
heterogeneous, increased opportunities for social learning not only need not improve welfare,
but indeed can be strictly Pareto-harmful. By contrast, in environments where equilibrium
is all-or-nothing, increasing the potential for social learning is (essentially) always strictly
beneficial and speeds up learning at all times.

1.1

Related Literature

This paper links the large and interdisciplinary literature on innovation adoption, which
seeks to explain why the diffusion of innovations is typically a drawn-out process and why
S-shaped (and to a lesser extent concave) adoption patterns are prevalent, with the theoretical literature on strategic experimentation, on which we build to study the informational
externalities that arise under forward-looking social learning.
Our contribution to the former literature is twofold. First, we identify a novel, purely informational channel for the aforementioned regularities: Under forward-looking social learning, S-shaped growth can arise due to some consumers delaying adoption in the hope of
learning whether previous adopters suffered negative experiences, while concave adoption
might arise when consumers are very optimistic, impatient, or when public signals are expected to reveal positive information about the innovation. Existing models instead rely on
a combination of the following ingredients (for detailed surveys, see Geroski, 2000; Baptista,
1999): (i) heterogeneity of potential adopters, where the distribution of characteristics is imposed exogenously to yield the desired adoption pattern—as in “probit” models (e.g., David,
4

Indeed, typical marketing textbooks devote a chapter to these two patterns; see Hoyer et al. (2012), Ch.
15, p. 425ff. and Keillor (2007) p. 46–61. The former type of curve is sometimes referred to as “logistic” and
the latter as “exponential” or “fast-break”. In economics, S-curves are studied by Griliches (1957), Mansfield
(1961, 1968), Gort and Klepper (1982), among many others; for (essentially) concave curves see some of the
“group A” innovations in Davies (1979).
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1969; Davies, 1979; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993), or existing learning-based models with
myopic consumers (Young, 2009) or exogenous signals (Jensen, 1982);5 (ii) non-informational
“spillover” effects which, independently of the quality of the innovation, increase current adoption as a function of past adoption—e.g., through a process of contagion as in “epidemic”
models (e.g., Mansfield, 1961; Bass, 1969; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985) or due to pure payoff
externalities resulting from learning-by-doing (Jovanovic and Lach, 1989) or network effects
(Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986); (iii) supply-side factors such as pricing (e.g., Bergemann
and Välimäki, 1997; Cabral, 2012). To highlight the explanatory power of informational
incentives alone, our model abstracts away from (i)–(iii), though in many settings these factors are, of course, likely to be at play as well. Second, however, Sections 4.2–4.3 investigate
the effect of increased opportunities for social learning and obtain welfare implications and
testable predictions that are outside the scope of existing models.
Our model builds on the framework of strategic experimentation with exponential/Poisson bandits, originating with Keller et al. (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010, 2015)
(for a survey, see Hörner and Skrzypacz, 2016).6 We introduce two main departures: First,
we assume that adoption (i.e., exit to the risky arm) is irreversible rather than allowing for
continuous back-and-forth switching; this is natural for innovations such as medical procedures or movies, for which “consumption” is typically a one-time event, or for technologies
with large switching costs. Second, we assume a continuum of agents, who each have a
negligible influence on public information. These departures entail a new qualitative difference between bad and good news learning—the presence vs. absence of partial adoption
regions—that has observable implications for adoption curves. In contrast, in the above
strategic experimentation models, the unique symmetric Markov equilibrium features a region of partial experimentation/mixing under both bad and good news. Another implication
of these departures is that, unlike strategic experimentation, our setting does not feature an
“encouragement effect,” where agents have an incentive to increase current experimentation
to drive up beliefs and induce more future experimentation by others. This yields new comparative statics that isolate the impact of informational free-riding: For example, while in
the bad news environment of Keller and Rady (2015), an increase in the number of players
or signal informativeness makes players more willing to experiment at pessimistic beliefs, the
saturation effect in Proposition 1 relies on the opposite prediction.
Many recent papers study good or bad news Poisson learning in other economic settings
5

Under myopic or exogenous learning, individual consumers follow a cutoff rule, adopting the innovation
iff beliefs are above a certain threshold. Thus, regions of convex adoption growth cannot arise with identical
consumers, and instead require specific forms of heterogeneity in prior beliefs or preferences.
6
Keller et al. (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010) study learning via conclusive and inconclusive good
news, while Keller and Rady (2015) consider (in)conclusive bad news.
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(e.g., Strulovici, 2010; Bonatti and Hörner, 2011, 2017; Halac et al., 2016, 2017; Guo, 2016;
Cripps and Thomas, 2019; Thomas, 2019a,b). Like ours, most of these papers focus on
conclusive signals for tractability. Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2013), Halac and Kremer
(2020), and Khromenkova (2015) contrast the implications of bad vs. good news learning
for reputation-building, career concerns, and collective decision-making. Wolitzky (2018)
considers steady-state adoption levels of an innovation when consumers learn from a random
sample of others’ outcomes and compares efficiency for cost-saving vs. outcome-improving
innovations. Che and Hörner (2018) take a mechanism design approach to incentivizing social
learning about a new product. Laiho and Salmi (2018) build on our model by incorporating
monopoly pricing and consumer heterogeneity.
Finally, informational externalities and strategic delay incentives are also studied by the
observational learning literature with endogenous timing; see, e.g., Chamley and Gale (1994)
and, more closely related, Murto and Välimäki (2011), where players privately obtain Poisson
signals about the quality of a risky project at a fixed exogenous rate until they choose to
irreversibly exit to a safe outside option.7 The key difference is that in this literature players
hold private information about a payoff-relevant state and make inferences by observing
others’ actions, whereas all news in our model is public and derived from previous adopters’
experiences. Information aggregates in random bursts in these models rather than smoothly
as in our setting, and the aforementioned papers do not derive adoption curves or study
the way in which they are shaped by qualitative and quantitative features of the learning
environment.

2

Model

2.1

The Game

Time t ∈ [0, +∞) is continuous. At time t = 0, an innovation of unknown quality θ ∈
{G = 1, B = −1} and of unlimited supply is released to a continuum population of potential
consumers of mass N̄0 ∈ R>0 . Consumers are ex ante identical: They have a common prior
p0 ∈ (0, 1) that θ = G; they are forward-looking with common discount rate r > 0; and they
have the same actions and payoffs, as specified below.
At each time t, consumers receive stochastic opportunities to adopt the innovation. Adoption opportunities are generated independently across consumers and across histories accord7

In earlier papers on observational learning, the timing of players’ moves is exogenous (e.g., Banerjee, 1992;
Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000). Board and Meyer-ter Vehn (2020) study innovation
adoption on networks with exogenous timing and observational learning from others’ adoption decisions.
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ing to a Poisson process with exogenous arrival rate ρ > 0.8 Upon an adoption opportunity,
a consumer must choose whether to adopt the innovation (at = 1) or to wait (at = 0). If a
consumer adopts, he receives an expected lump sum payoff of Et [θ], conditioned on information available up to time t, and drops out of the game. If the consumer chooses to wait or
does not receive an adoption opportunity at t, he receives a flow payoff of 0 until his next
adoption opportunity, where he faces the same decision again.

2.2

Learning

Over time, consumers observe public signals that convey information about the quality of
the innovation. To highlight the importance of qualitative and quantitative features of the
informational environment, we employ a variation of the Poisson learning models widely
used in the literature on strategic experimentation. Let Nt denote the flow of of consumers
newly adopting the innovation at time t, which we define more precisely in Section 2.3.
Then, conditional on quality θ, public signals arrive according to an inhomogeneous Poisson
process with arrival rate (εθ + λθ Nt )dt, where λθ > 0 and εθ ≥ 0 are exogenous parameters
that depend on the quality θ of the innovation.
The signal process summarizes news events that are generated from two sources: First, the
social learning term λNt represents news generated endogenously, based on the experiences
of other consumers: It captures the idea of a flow Nt of new adopters each generating signals
at rate λ dt.9 Thus, the greater the flow of consumers adopting the innovation at t, the
more likely it is for a signal to arrive at t, and hence the absence of a signal at t is more
informative the larger Nt . Second, we also allow for (but do not require) signals to arrive at
a fixed exogenous rate ε dt, representing information generated independently of consumers’
behavior, for example, by professional critics or government watchdog agencies.
As in many applications of Poisson learning, we focus for tractability on perfect news
processes, where a single signal provides conclusive evidence of the quality of the innovation.
Qualitatively, there is then a natural distinction between two types of news environments:
Learning is via perfect bad news (for short, bad news) if εG = λG = 0 and εB = ε ≥ 0,
λB = λ > 0; that is, the arrival of a signal (called a breakdown) is conclusive evidence
that the innovation is bad. Learning is via perfect good news (for short, good news) if
εB = λB = 0 and εG = ε ≥ 0, λG = λ > 0; that is, a signal arrival (called a breakthrough) is
conclusive evidence that the innovation is good. The nature of the news environment may
8
Stochasticity of adoption opportunities might capture cognitive and time constraints that prevent consumers from considering whether or not to adopt the innovation at every instant in continuous time. We
further discuss stochastic adoption opportunities in Section 5.
9
We obtain´ qualitatively similar results when the social learning component at time t is taken to depend
t
on the stock, 0 Ns ds, rather than the flow of adopters at t. See the discussion in Section 5.
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be influenced by limitations or usage practices of the available social learning systems (for
example, if a review platform allows users to “Like” a product, but has no “Dislike” button);
or by whether a bad or good quality innovation is more likely to generate newsworthy (e.g.,
extreme) payoff realizations.10
Quantitatively, we use Λ0 := λN̄0 as a simple measure of the potential for social
learning in the economy, summarizing both the likelihood λ with which individual adopters’
experiences find their way into the public domain and the size N̄0 of the population which
can contribute to and access the common pool of information.
Evolution of Beliefs: Under bad news learning, consumers’ posterior on θ = G permanently jumps to 0 at the first breakdown, while under good news, consumers’ posterior on
θ = G permanently jumps to 1 at the first breakthrough. Let pt denote consumers’ no-news
posterior, i.e., the belief at t that θ = G conditional on no signals having arrived on [0, t).
Given a flow of adopters Ns≥0 , Bayesian updating implies that
pt =

−

p0 e

´t

p0 e−

0 (εG +λG Ns )ds

´t

0 (εG +λG Ns )ds

+ (1 − p0 )e

−

´t

0 (εB +λB Ns )ds

.11

(1)

In particular, if Nτ is continuous in an open interval (s, s + ν) for ν > 0, then pτ for
τ ∈ (s, s + ν) evolves according to the ODE
ṗτ = ((εB + λB Nτ ) − (εG + λG Nτ )) pτ (1 − pτ ).
Note that the no-news posterior is continuous. Moreover, it is increasing under bad news
and decreasing under good news.

2.3

Equilibrium

Since our interest is in the aggregate adoption dynamics of the population, we take as the
primitive of our equilibrium concept the aggregate flow Nt≥0 of consumers newly adopting
the innovation over time and do not explicitly model individual consumers’ behavior. Given
our focus on perfect news processes, incentives are non-trivial only in the absence of signals:
10

Slightly more formally, suppose payoffs of the good
are distributed (i.i.d
´∞
´ ∞ vs. bad quality innovation
across consumers) according to FG and FB , where −∞ ξdFG (ξ) = 1 and −∞ ξdFB (ξ) = −1. Suppose
payoff realizations ξ are newsworthy iff either ξ ≤ ξ or ξ ≥ ξ, for some “extreme” low and high payoffs ξ < ξ,
and that newsworthy payoffs generate public signals at some rate. Then bad news learning assumes FB (ξ) >
0 = FG (ξ) and FB (ξ) = FG (ξ) = 1, i.e., bad innovations sometimes generate extreme low realizations, but
neither good nor bad innovations generate extreme high payoffs. Analogously, good news learning assumes
FB (ξ) = FG (ξ) = 0 and FB (ξ) = 1 > FG (ξ).
11
Definition 1 imposes measurability on N , so this expression is well-defined.
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Under bad news, no consumers adopt after a breakdown, while under good news all remaining
consumers adopt at their first opportunity following a breakthrough. Thus, we henceforth
let Nt denote the flow of new adopters at t conditional on no signals up to time t and define
equilibrium in terms of this quantity. Capturing that aggregate adoption is predictable with
respect to the news process of the economy, we require Nt to be a deterministic function of
time. We consider all such functions that are feasible in the following sense:
Definition 1. A feasible flow of adopters is a right-continuous function N : [0, +∞) → R
´t
such that Nt := N (t) ∈ [0, ρN̄t ] for all t ∈ [0, +∞), where N̄t := N̄0 − 0 Ns ds.
Here N̄t denotes the mass of consumers remaining in the game at time t. We require
that Nt ≤ ρN̄t so that Nt is consistent with the remaining N̄t consumers independently
receiving adoption opportunities at Poisson rate ρ. Any feasible adoption flow Nt≥0 defines
an associated no-news posterior pN
t as given by (1).
In equilibrium, we require that at each time t, Nt is consistent with optimal behavior
by the remaining N̄t forward-looking consumers: A consumer who receives an adoption
opportunity at t optimally trades off his expected payoff to adopting against his value to
waiting, given that he assigns probability pN
t to θ = G and expects the population’s adoption
behavior to evolve according to the process Ns≥0 . For this we first define the value to waiting.
Let Σt denote the set of all right-continuous functions σ : [t, +∞) → {0, 1}. Under the
Poisson process generating adoption opportunities, any σ ∈ Σt defines a random time τ σ at
which, absent signals, the consumer will adopt the innovation and drop out of the game.12
Let WtN (σ) denote the expected payoff to waiting at t and following σ in the future, given the
aggregate adoption flow Ns≥0 . Specifically, under bad news learning, σ prescribes adoption
at the random time τ σ if and only if there have been no breakdowns prior to τ σ , yielding
h

i
´ σ
σ
N − tτ (ε+λNs ) ds
WtN (σ) := E e−r(τ −t) pN
−
(1
−
p
)e
,
t
t
where the expectation is with respect to the Poisson process generating adoption opportunities. Under good news learning, following σ means that at any adoption opportunity prior
to τ σ , adoption occurs only if there has been a breakthrough, and at τ σ adoption occurs
whether or not there has been a breakthrough. For any time s ≥ t, denote by τs the random
12

Formally, let (Xs )s≥t denote the stochastic process representing the number of arrivals generated on
[t, s] by a Poisson process with arrival rate ρ, and let (Xs− )s>t denote the number of arrivals on [t, s). Then
τ σ := inf{s ≥ t : σs × (Xs − Xs− ) > 0}, with the usual convention that inf ∅ := +∞. It is well-known that
the hitting time of a right-continuous process of an open set is an optional time. Therefore, the expectations
in the definition of the value to waiting are well-defined.
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time at which the first adoption opportunity after s arrives. Then WtN (σ) is given by


ˆτ σ

´
´ τσ
−r(τ σ −t)
− ts (ε+λNk ) dk −r(τs −t)
− t (ε+λNs ) ds
e
ds ,
+ (1 − pt ) e
(2pτ σ − 1) + pt (ε + λNs ) e
E pt e
t

where the expectation is again with respect to the Poisson process generating adoption
opportunities.
The value to waiting at t is the payoff to waiting and behaving optimally in the future:
Definition 2. The value to waiting given a feasible adoption flow Nt≥0 is the function
W N : R+ → R+ defined by WtN := supσ∈Σt WtN (σ) for all t.
We are now ready to formally define equilibrium:
Definition 3. An equilibrium is a feasible adoption flow Nt≥0 such that
(i). WtN ≥ 2pN
t − 1 for all t such that Nt < ρN̄t ; and
(ii). WtN ≤ 2pN
t − 1 for all t such that 0 < Nt .
Condition (i) says that if some consumers who receive an adoption opportunity at t
decide not to adopt, then the value to waiting, WtN , must weakly exceed the expected payoff
to immediate adoption, 2pN
t − 1. Similarly, condition (ii) requires that if some consumers
adopt at time t, then the value to waiting must be weakly less than the payoff to immediate
adoption. Thus, at all times, Nt is consistent with consumers optimally trading off the
expected payoff to immediate adoption against the value to waiting.13

3
3.1

Equilibrium Analysis
Quasi-Single Crossing Property for Equilibrium Incentives

We now proceed to equilibrium analysis. As a preliminary step, we establish a useful structural property of equilibrium incentives under both bad and good news. Suppose that Nt≥0
is an arbitrary feasible flow of adopters, with associated no-news posterior pN
t≥0 and value
N
to waiting Wt≥0 . In general, the dynamics of the trade-off between immediate adoption at
13
Definition 3 is essentially Nash equilibrium, i.e., does not impose subgame perfection. The motivation
is that in a continuum population any individual consumer’s behavior has a negligible impact on aggregate
adoption levels, so that any off-path history in which the flow of adopters differs from the equilibrium flow is
more than a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium path. Thus, off-path histories do not affect individual
consumers’ incentives on the equilibrium path and are unimportant for equilibrium analysis.
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time t (yielding expected payoff 2pN
t − 1) and delaying and behaving optimally in the future
N
(yielding expected payoff WtN ) can be quite difficult to characterize, with (2pN
t − 1) − Wt
changing sign many times. However, when Nt≥0 is an equilibrium flow, then for any t,
N
2pN
t − 1 < Wt =⇒ Nt = 0; and
N
2pN
t − 1 > Wt =⇒ Nt = ρN̄t ;

and this imposes considerable discipline on the dynamics of the trade-off. Indeed, the folN
lowing result shows that 2pN
t − 1 and Wt satisfy a quasi-single crossing property: There can
be at most one transition from strict preference for adoption to strict preference for waiting,
or vice versa, with a possible period of indifference in between.
Lemma 1. Suppose that learning is either via bad news (λB > 0 = λG ) or via good news
(λG > 0 = λB ). Let Nt≥0 be an equilibrium, with corresponding no-news posteriors pN
t≥0 and
N
N
N
value to waiting Wt≥0 . Then Wt≥0 and 2pt≥0 −1 satisfy quasi-single crossing, in the following
sense:
N
N
• If (λB − λG )(WtN − (2pN
t − 1)) < 0, then (λB − λG )(Wτ − (2pτ − 1)) < 0 for all τ > t.
N
N
• If (λB − λG )(WtN − (2pN
t − 1)) ≤ 0, then (λB − λG )(Wτ − (2pτ − 1)) ≤ 0 for all τ > t.

The proof is in Appendix A.1. We briefly illustrate the intuition for the first bullet point
when learning is via bad news. Suppose that immediate adoption is strictly better than
waiting today, and hence also in the near future provided there are no breakdowns.14 Then,
in equilibrium, in the near future all consumers adopt upon their first opportunity, so the nonews posterior strictly increases while the number of remaining consumers strictly decreases.
Because information is generated endogenously, this means that the flow of information must
decrease over time. As a result, immediate adoption becomes even more attractive relative
to waiting, and hence remains strictly preferable at all times in the future.
Given Lemma 1, we associate two cutoff times 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ t∗2 ≤ +∞ with any equilibrium
Nt≥0 :15 If learning is via bad news, set
t∗1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Nt > 0} and t∗2 := sup{t ≥ 0 : Nt < ρN̄t }.

(2)

If learning is via good news, set
t∗1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Nt < ρN̄t } and t∗2 := sup{t ≥ 0 : Nt > 0}.
14
15

This follows from the continuity of the equilibrium value to waiting; see Lemma A.1.
With the convention that inf ∅ = +∞ and sup ∅ = 0.
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(3)

Wait
0

Indifference
t∗1

Adopt

Adopt

t∗2

0

Wait
t∗1 = t∗2

Figure 1: Equilibrium structure under bad news (left) vs. good news (right).

Thus, if Nt≥0 is a bad news equilibrium it features no adoption (Nt = 0) for all t < t∗1
and immediate adoption (Nt = ρN̄t ) for all t > t∗2 absent breakdowns; under good news,
Nt≥0 features immediate adoption prior to t∗1 and no adoption after t∗2 absent breakthroughs.
N
Lemma 1 implies that at all times t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ), consumers are indifferent (2pN
t − 1 = Wt )
between adopting and delaying under both bad and good news.16
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we will build on this observation to establish equilibrium existence
and uniqueness under both bad and good news. As illustrated in Figure 1, we will see that
the good news equilibrium satisfies t∗1 = t∗2 = t∗ ; thus, adoption behavior is all-or-nothing,
with all consumers adopting upon their first opportunity up to time t∗ and adoption ceasing
from then on absent breakthroughs. By contrast, the bad news equilibrium features a nonempty region (t∗1 , t∗2 ) for suitable parameters. Maintaining indifference throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 )
requires a form of informational free-riding, which we term partial adoption, whereby
only some consumers adopt when given the chance. We will see that partial adoption has
important implications for the shape of the adoption curve and for the impact of increased
opportunities for social learning on welfare, learning, and adoption dynamics.

3.2

Bad News Equilibrium

First, consider learning via bad news. Building on the preceding structural result, the
following theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The equilibrium
flow of adopters Nt is Markovian in the associated no-news posterior pt and the time-t
potential for social learning Λt := λN̄t :
Theorem 1 (Bad News Equilibrium). Fix r, ρ, λ, N̄0 > 0, ε ≥ 0, and p0 ∈ (0, 1). There
exists a unique equilibrium Nt . Moreover, Nt is Markovian in (pt , Λt ) for all t: There exists
Consider the good news case (bad news is analogous). Fix t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ). By the definition of t∗1 and t∗2 ,
there exist k ∈ (t∗1 , t) and l ∈ (t, t∗2 ) such that Nk < ρN̄k and Nl > 0. Since N is an equilibrium, this implies
2pk − 1 ≤ Wk and 2pl − 1 ≥ Wl , whence Lemma 1 yields 2pt − 1 = Wt .
16
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a non-decreasing function Λ∗ : [0, 1] → R ∪ {∞} and some p∗ ∈ [ 12 , 1) such that

Nt =




0



if pt < p∗ and Λt > Λ∗ (pt )

r(2pt −1)

λ(1−pt )



ρN̄

−

ε
λ

∈ (0, ρN̄t ) if pt ≥ p∗ and Λt > Λ∗ (pt )

(4)

if Λt ≤ Λ∗ (pt ).

t

As we saw in the previous section, for any equilibrium, (2) yields cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2
such that no consumers adopt at times t < t∗1 , all consumers adopt upon an opportunity
at times t > t∗2 , and consumers are indifferent between immediate adoption and waiting at
all intermediate times t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ). Theorem 1 implies that t∗1 and t∗2 are uniquely pinned
down by the parameters. Moreover, whenever t∗1 < t∗2 (as we will see is the case for suitable
parameter values), the flow of adopters throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 ) is also uniquely pinned down. The
proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A.2. Below we sketch the basic argument:
Partial adoption during (t∗1 , t∗2 ). Lemma A.6 shows that the flow of adopters at all
t −1)
times t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) must satisfy Nt = r(2p
− λε ∈ (0, ρN̄t ). Thus, adoption throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 )
λ(1−pt )
is partial, with only some consumers adopting when given a chance and others free-riding on
the information generated by the adopters. Heuristically, maintaining consumer indifference
requires that the cost and benefit of delaying be equal:

Benefit of Delay

Cost of Delay

z
}|
{ z
}|
{
(ε + λNt ) (1 − pt )dt (0 − (−1)) = (1 − (ε + λNt ) (1 − pt )dt) (2pt+dt − 1)rdt .
|
|
{z
} | {z }
{z
}|
{z
}
Probability of
breakdown

Benefit:
Avoid Bad Product

Probability of
no breakdown

(5)

Cost:
Discounting

Delaying one’s decision by an instant is beneficial if a breakdown occurs at that instant,
allowing a consumer to permanently avoid the bad product. The gain in this case is (0 −
(−1)) = 1, and this possibility arises with an instantaneous probability of (ε + λNt ) (1−pt )dt.
On the other hand, if no breakdown occurs, which happens with instantaneous probability
1−(ε + λNt ) (1−pt )dt, then consumers incur an opportunity cost of (2pt+dt −1)rdt, reflecting
the time cost of delayed adoption. Ignoring terms of order dt2 and rearranging yields Nt =
r(2pt −1)
− λε .17
λ(1−pt )
Determining the cutoff times. Next, Lemma A.7 provides an alternative description
of the cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2 in terms of the evolution of the no-news posterior pt and the
potential for social learning Λt . To see the idea, let p denote the lowest posterior at which a
More precisely, ignoring terms of order dt2 , the right hand side of (5) is given by (1 − (ε + λNt ) (1 −
pt )dt)(2(pt + ṗt dt) − 1)rdt = r(2pt − 1)dt. Rearranging yields the desired expression. Note that ρ does not
enter into this expression. This is because in the indifference region consumers obtain the same continuation
payoff regardless of whether or not they receive an adoption opportunity in the interval (t, t + dt).
17
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Λ∗ (p)

Λt

partial
adoption

(III)

(IV)
(I)

wait

adopt

(II)

wait

p

p

p]

1

pt

Figure 2: Equilibrium dynamics of (pt , Λt ) when ε < ρ.

consumer to whom adoption opportunities arrive at rate ρ is willing to adopt immediately
if all information in the future arrives exclusively through the exogenous news source (i.e.,
(ε+r)(r+ρ)
at rate ε). In the appendix, we show that p = 2(ε+r)(r+ρ)−ερ
. Then
p := lim p =
ρ→∞

ε+r
ε + 2r

and

p] := lim p =
ε→∞

ρ+r
ρ + 2r

denote, respectively, the values of p in the limit as adoption opportunities arrive continuously
or as exogenous information fully resolves all uncertainty by the next instant. Note that
p < p, p] . Moreover, p] > p if and only if ε < ρ (see Figure 2).
For any belief p ∈ (p, p] ), we show that there is a unique mass N̄ ∗ (p) ∈ R+ of remaining
consumers with the following property: If all these remaining consumers adopt at their
first future opportunity, then a consumer with current posterior p is indifferent between
immediate adoption and adoption at his next opportunity (absent breakdowns). Based on
this, define the function Λ∗ : [0, 1] → R+ ∪ {+∞}, depicted in Figure 2: For p ∈ (p, p] ),
set Λ∗ (p) = λN̄ ∗ (p); for p ≤ p, set Λ∗ (p) = 0; for p ≥ p] , set Λ∗ (p) = +∞. Then, letting
p∗ := min{p, p] }, Lemma A.7 shows that the cutoff times satisfy t∗2 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Λt < Λ∗ (pt )}
and t∗1 = min{t∗2 , sup{t ≥ 0 : pt < p∗ }}.
Equilibrium dynamics given initial parameters. The previous two steps imply that
any equilibrium must take the Markovian form in (4). It remains to show how (4) uniquely
pins down the evolution of Nt as a function of the initial parameters, and to verify that
Nt≥0 does indeed constitute an equilibrium (in particular, is feasible). We briefly sketch the
15

former argument, relegating the latter to the appendix. We impose two conditions that rule
out uninteresting values of ε, ρ and p0 , under which equilibrium adoption is either identically
zero or there is never a partial adoption region (i.e., t∗1 = t∗2 regardless of other parameters):18
Condition 1. Either ε > 0 or p0 ∈ ( 12 , 1).
Condition 2. The rate at which exogenous information arrives is lower than the rate at
which consumers obtain adoption opportunities: ε < ρ.
Figure 2 illustrates equilibrium dynamics under these conditions. The values of (pt , Λt )
in region (I) correspond to the third line of (4), i.e., to immediate adoption. Regions (II)
and (III) correspond to the first line of (4); that is, no adoption takes place in these regions.
Finally, region (IV) corresponds to partial adoption as given by the second line of (4).
If (p0 , Λ0 ) starts off in region (I) or (II), then equilibrium features no partial adoption.
In the former case, we have t∗1 = t∗2 = 0, so that all consumers adopt upon their first
opportunity. In the latter case, initially all consumers delay and the no-news posterior drifts
upward according to the law of motion ṗt = pt (1 − pt )ε, while Λt remains unchanged at Λ0 .
This yields a unique time t∗1 = t∗2 > 0 at which (pt , Λt ) hits the boundary between regions
(II) and (I); subsequently, all consumers adopt immediately upon an opportunity.
By contrast, if (p0 , Λ0 ) is in region (III) or (IV), then t∗1 < t∗2 . In the former case, initial
dynamics are the same as in region (II). But now this yields a unique time t∗1 > 0 at which
(pt , Λt ) hits the boundary separating regions (III) and (IV), which implies that t∗1 < t∗2 .
Throughout [t∗1 , t∗2 ), the evolution of (pt , Λt ) is pinned down by the second line of (4), and
t∗2 is uniquely given by the first time at which (pt , Λt ) enters region (I).19 Analogously, if
(p0 , Λ0 ) is in region (IV), then t∗1 = 0 and t∗2 > t∗1 is the first time at which (pt , Λt ), evolving
according to the second line of (4), enters region (I).
Conditions for partial adoption. As seen above, whether or not the equilibrium
features a period of partial adoption depends on the fundamentals. More specifically, Figure 2
shows that provided consumers are not too optimistic or impatient (i.e., p0 < p] ),20 then
t∗1 < t∗2 holds whenever the potential for social learning Λ0 is sufficiently large:
18
If Condition 1 is violated, then (4) implies that Nt = 0 for all t. If Condition 2 is violated, then
p∗ := min{p, p] } = p] . Thus, Lemma A.7 implies that Nt = 0 as long as Λt > Λ∗ (pt ) and Nt = ρN̄t as soon
as Λt ≤ Λ∗ (pt ).
19
Specifically, combining the second line of (4) with (1) yields the ODE ṗt = rpt (2pt − 1). Given the
p t∗
1
. Plugging this back into
initial value pt∗1 = p, this uniquely pins down pt via pt =
r(t−t∗
1)
2pt∗ −e
1

r(2pt −1)
λ(1−pt )

ε
λ

Nt =
− pins down Λt = λN̄t . Note that since pt∗1 >
finite time. Thus, t∗2 = inf{t : Λt < Λ∗ (pt )} < +∞.
20
Note that p] is decreasing in the discount rate r.
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1
2,

(2pt∗ −1)
1

pt is strictly increasing and reaches p] in

Lemma 2. Fix ρ, ε and p0 satisfying Conditions 1 and 2, and r > 0. Assume p0 < p] . Then
there exists Λ̄0 > 0 such that t∗1 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ0 ) if and only if Λ0 > Λ̄0 .21
On the other hand, if as in existing learning-based models of innovation adoption, learning
is purely exogenous (λ = 0 and ε > 0) or consumers are myopic (“r = +∞”), then there is
never any partial adoption, regardless of other parameters. In the former case, 0 = Λt <
Λ∗ (p) for all p > p, so by Theorem 1 no consumers adopt until the no-news posterior hits
p, and from then on all consumers adopt immediately when given a chance. The latter case
corresponds to p = p = 12 and Λ∗ (p) = +∞ for all p > 12 , so t∗1 = t∗2 = inf{t : pt > 12 }. Thus,
the possibility of partial adoption in equilibrium hinges crucially both on consumers being
forward-looking and on there being opportunities for social learning.

3.3

Good News Equilibrium

Next, consider learning via good news. As under bad news, there is a unique equilibrium
Nt≥0 , and Nt is Markovian in the state variables (pt , Λt ). Notably, however, regardless of
the potential for social learning in the economy, the equilibrium is all-or-nothing: There is
a cutoff belief p∗ above which all consumers adopt if given an opportunity and below which
no consumers adopt.
Theorem 2 (Good News Equilibrium). Fix r, ρ, λ, N̄0 > 0, ε ≥ 0, and p0 ∈ (0, 1). There exists a unique equilibrium Nt . Moreover, Nt is Markovian in (pt , Λt ) (or equivalently (pt , N̄t ))
for all t and satisfies:

ρN̄ if p > p∗
t
t
(6)
Nt =
0
if pt ≤ p∗ ,
where
p∗ =

(ε + r)(r + ρ)
.
2(ε + r)(r + ρ) − ερ

We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix A.3. We again invoke the quasi-single crossing property
in Lemma 1. As we saw in Section 3.1, this implies that in any equilibrium, there are times
0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ t∗2 ≤ +∞ such that absent breakthroughs, Nt = ρN̄t if t < t∗1 , Nt = 0 if t > t∗2 , and
throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 ) consumers are indifferent between adopting immediately and waiting.
The key observation (Lemma A.9) is that we must in fact have t∗1 = t∗2 =: t∗ . To see
the intuition, suppose t∗1 < t∗2 . Then consumers would be indifferent between adopting and
delaying at each time t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ). Moreover, there is t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) and ∆ ∈ (0, t∗2 − t) such that
21

By the Markovian description in (4), Λ0 is a sufficient statistic for equilibrium; i.e., holding other
fundamentals fixed, Λ0 pins down the equilibrium adoption flow, beliefs, and cutoff times t∗1 (Λ0 ) and t∗2 (Λ0 ).
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Nτ > 0 throughout [t, t + ∆).22 As with bad news learning, we can compare a consumer’s
payoff to adopting at t with the payoff to delaying his decision by an instant:

r(2pt − 1)dt + pt (λNt + ε)dt 1 −

ρ
r+ρ


.

The first term represents the gain to immediate adoption if no breakthrough occurs
between t and t+dt, which happens with instantaneous probability (1−pt (λNt +ε)dt). Just as
under bad news, the gain to adopting immediately in this case is r(2pt+dt −1)dt, representing
time discounting at rate r and the fact that at t+dt the consumer remains indifferent between
adopting and delaying. Ignoring terms of order dt2 yields r(2pt − 1)dt. The second term
represents the gain to immediate adoption if there is a breakthrough between t and t + dt,
which happens with instantaneous probability pt (λNt + ε)dt > 0. Now the situation is
very different from the bad news setting: A breakthrough conclusively signals good quality,
so a consumer who delays his decision by an instant will adopt immediately at his next
ρ
, reflecting the stochasticity of adoption
opportunity. This results in a discounted payoff of r+ρ
ρ
opportunities. In contrast, by adopting at t, the consumer receives a payoff of 1 > r+ρ
immediately. Thus, regardless of whether or not there is a breakthrough between t and t+dt,
there is a strictly positive gain to adopting immediately at t, contradicting indifference at t.
The above argument illustrates an important difference between bad and good news
learning that is new relative to existing strategic experimentation models (see the discussion
in Section 1.1). In order to maintain a period of indifference between immediate adoption
and waiting, it must be possible to acquire decision-relevant information by waiting an
instant: Consumers who are prepared to adopt at t will be willing to delay their decision by
an instant only if there is a possibility that at the next instant they will no longer be willing
to adopt. In the bad news setting, this is indeed possible, because a breakdown might occur.
In contrast, if learning is via good news, this cannot happen: A breakthrough between t and
t + dt reveals the innovation to be good, so consumers strictly prefer to adopt from t + dt
on; and if there is no breakthrough, then consumers remain indifferent at t + dt, so in either
case the information obtained is not decision-relevant. Of course, breakthroughs do convey
decision-relevant information at beliefs where consumers strictly prefer to delay. But in the
interior of a region of indifference, such beliefs cannot be reached instantaneously.
Given that t∗1 = t∗2 = t∗ , Theorem 2 follows from the observation that pt ≤ p∗ if and only
if t ≥ t∗ (Lemma A.10). It is worth noting that if ε = 0, then p∗ = 12 , so regardless of the
discount rate r, consumers behave entirely myopically. If ε > 0, then consumers’ forwardBy definition of t∗2 , there exists t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) such that Nt > 0. By right-continuity of N , we must then
have Nτ > 0 for all τ > t sufficiently close.
22
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looking nature is reflected by the fact that the cutoff posterior p∗ below which consumers are
(ε+r)(r+ρ)
> 12 . In both cases, p∗ does not depend on λ or N̄0 : Social
unwilling to adopt is 2(ε+r)(r+ρ)−ερ
learning only affects the time t∗ at which adoption ceases conditional on no breakthroughs.

4

Implications

We now study implications of the preceding equilibrium analysis for observed adoption patterns, as well as for the effect of increased opportunities for social learning on welfare,
learning, and adoption dynamics.

4.1

Adoption Curves: S-Shaped vs. Concave

Consider the adoption curve of the innovation, which plots the share of adopters in the
population against time. Conditional on no news up to time t, this is given by
ˆt
At :=

Ns /N̄0 ds.
0

Theorems 1 and 2 translate into the following predictions for the shape of the adoption curve:
Corollary 1. Bad News: In the unique equilibrium of Theorem 1, At has the following
shape: For 0 ≤ t < t∗1 , At = 0. For t∗1 ≤ t < t∗2 , At is strictly increasing and convex in t.
For t ≥ t∗2 , At is strictly increasing and concave in t. If the first breakdown occurs at time t,
then adoption comes to a standstill from then on.
Good News: In the unique equilibrium of Theorem 2, At = 1 − e−ρt is strictly increasing
and concave for all t < t∗ . If there is a breakthrough prior to t∗ , then At = 1−e−ρt for all t. If
the first breakthrough occurs at s > t∗ , then adoption comes to a temporary standstill between
∗
t∗ and s, and for all t ≥ s, At is strictly increasing and concave and given by 1 − e−ρ(t +t−s) .
Thus, in bad news markets, the adoption curve exhibits an “S-shaped” (i.e., convexconcave) growth pattern whenever t∗1 < t∗2 , where the region of convex growth coincides with
the partial adoption region (t∗1 , t∗2 ). By contrast, in good news markets, adoption proceeds in
(possibly multiple) “concave bursts.” Concave adoption curves also arise in bad news markets
with very optimistic and impatient consumers or with little potential for social learning (in
which case t∗1 = t∗2 by Lemma 2). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the differing adoption patterns.
The fact that the convex growth period of At under bad news coincides with the partial
adoption region (t∗1 , t∗2 ) is tied to consumer indifference in this region: Conditional on no
breakdowns during this period, consumers grow increasingly optimistic about the quality
19

Figure 3: S-shaped adoption curve under bad news conditional on no breakdowns (t∗1 = 0).
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Figure 4: Concave adoption curves under good news: blue = breakthrough before t∗ ; yellow =
breakthrough after t∗ ; pink = bad quality. (Parameters: ε = 1/2, r = 1, ρ = 1, λ = 0.5, p0 = 0.7.)

of the innovation, which increases their opportunity cost of delaying adoption. To maintain indifference, the benefit to delaying adoption must then also increase over time: This
is achieved by increasing the arrival rate of future breakdowns, which improves the odds
that waiting will allow consumers to avoid the bad product. But since the arrival rate of
information is increasing in the flow Nt of new adopters, this means that Nt must be strictly
increasing throughout (t∗1 , t∗2 ). Since Nt represents the rate of change of At , this is equivalent to At being convex.23 By contrast, the concave growth regions under both bad and
good news simply reflect the gradual depletion of the population when all consumers adopt
immediately upon an opportunity.
23
This argument for convex growth does not rely on the linearity of λNt ; it remains valid as long as the
rate at which the bad product generates breakdowns at t is increasing in Nt .

20

Figure 5: Initial convex growth in US microwave adoption levels through the late 1980s (Guenthner et al.,
1991). Later growth slowed to reach ownership levels of around 97% in 2011 (Williams, 2014).

As discussed in the Introduction, S-shaped adoption patterns are widely documented for
many different innovations. Our model complements existing explanations (see Section 1.1)
by identifying a purely informational channel for this regularity: If there is a high enough
chance that previous adopters’ experiences might reveal negative information about the
innovation, then as long as consumers are forward-looking, S-shaped adoption can arise
due to some consumers strategically delaying adoption. This channel may be especially
natural for innovations whose introduction was accompanied by substantial safety concerns:
A classic example are microwave ovens (Figure 5), whose introduction in the late 1960s
faced widespread concerns about possible “radiation leaks” and whose initial adoption levels
remained low despite the fact that the entry of Japanese firms into the US market led
to substantial price decreases in the early 1970s.24 Safety concerns may also be salient
for new medical procedures, for which S-shaped adoption patterns are again commonly
documented.25
Though less prevalent than S-shaped curves, concave adoption is another leading pattern documented in the marketing literature (e.g., Keillor, 2007, pp. 51–61), with leisureenhancing innovations such as movies, books, or beauty and fitness products as examples.
While our model abstracts away from many important product-specific details, Corollary 1
suggests some factors that could contribute to concave adoption patterns: In particular, high
levels of consumer impatience or optimism, or if social learning about a given product (for
24

See Wiersema and Buzzell (1979) for a detailed discussion.
For example, consider bariatric surgery, a collection of surgical weight loss procedures introduced in
the 1990s, for which health advice websites still feature warnings regarding possible serious complications.
Consistent with S-shaped adoption, the annual number of procedures worldwide (i.e., the number of new
adoptions) increased from 40,000 in 1998 to 146,301 in 2003 and to 344,221 in 2008, and then plateaued at
340,768 in 2011 (Buchwald and Oien, 2009, 2013).
25
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example, an essentially side-effect free herbal remedy) is primarily about “whether it actually
works” (i.e., good news events or their absence).

4.2

The Effect of Increased Opportunities for Social Learning

Next, we consider an increase in the potential for social learning Λ0 := λN̄0 , capturing either a greater ease of information transmission (e.g., due to the introduction of new social
networking platforms) or a larger community of consumers. We ask how this affects welfare,
learning, and adoption dynamics. Again, informational free-riding in the form of partial
adoption has important implications. Indeed, under bad news learning, an economy’s ability to harness its potential for social learning is subject to a saturation effect: Whenever
the equilibrium features partial adoption, then further increases in the potential for social
learning are welfare-neutral, cause learning to slow down over certain periods, and decrease
the adoption of (both good and bad) innovations at all times.
Formally, we fix all other parameters and study the effect of increasing Λ0 on ex-ante
equilibrium welfare W0 (Λ0 ); no-news posteriors pΛt 0 ; and expected adoption levels At (Λ0 , G)
and At (Λ0 , B) conditional on good and bad quality, respectively. We assume that the original
potential for social learning Λ0 is such that there is partial adoption, i.e, t∗1 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ0 );
under the conditions in Lemma 2, this is the case whenever Λ0 is large enough.
Proposition 1. Consider learning via bad news. Fix r, ρ, ε, and p0 . If Λ0 is such that
t∗1 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ0 ), then an increase in the potential for social learning to Λ̂0 > Λ0 has the
following effect:
(i). Welfare Neutrality: W0 (Λ̂0 ) = W0 (Λ0 ).
(ii). Non-Monotonicity of Learning: There exists t > t∗2 (Λ0 ) such that


pΛ0 = pΛ̂t 0

 t
pΛt 0 > pΛ̂t 0


 Λ0
pt < pΛ̂t 0

if t ≤ t∗2 (Λ0 )

(learning is equally fast under Λ0 and Λ̂0 )

if t∗2 (Λ0 ) < t < t

(learning is slower under Λ̂0 )

if t > t

(learning is faster under Λ̂0 ).

(iii). Slowdown in Adoption: For all t and θ = B, G, we have At (Λ0 , θ) ≥ At (Λ̂0 , θ), with
strict inequality for all t > t∗1 (Λ0 ).
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Online Appendix B.3. The idea behind welfare neutrality
is as follows. Since the equilibrium features partial adoption at Λ0 , the same is true when the
potential for social learning increases to Λ̂0 . Moreover, both the time t∗1 at which adoption
22

begins and the posterior pt∗1 at t∗1 are the same under Λ0 and Λ̂0 .26 But then, since consumers
strictly prefer to delay at all t < t∗1 and are indifferent between delaying and adopting at t∗1 ,
ex-ante welfare under both Λ0 and Λ̂0 corresponds to the expected payoff to waiting until t∗1
and adopting at t∗1 absent breakdowns. Thus, W0 (Λ̂0 ) = W0 (Λ0 ).
This welfare neutrality result contrasts with the cooperative benchmark where consumers
coordinate on socially optimal adoption levels: In the latter case, increased opportunities for
social learning are strictly beneficial and for any p0 > 21 the first-best (complete information)
ρ
payoff of r+ρ
p0 can be approximated in the limit as Λ0 → ∞.27 The result also contrasts
with myopic social learning or forward-looking exogenous learning, where welfare necessarily
increases in response to more informative signals (even if consumers are heterogeneous).28
Points (ii) and (iii) further illuminate the forces behind welfare neutrality. By (ii), an
increase in Λ0 affects learning dynamics in a non-monotonic manner. Thus, the impact on
a consumer’s expected payoff varies with the time t at which he obtains his first adoption
opportunity: If t ≤ t∗2 (Λ0 ), his expected payoff is the same under Λ0 and Λ̂0 . If t ∈ (t∗2 (Λ0 ), t),
he is strictly worse off under Λ̂0 , because in case the innovation is bad he is less likely to
have found out by then than under Λ0 . Finally, if t > t, he is strictly better off under Λ̂0 .
Depending on Λ̂0 , t adjusts endogenously to balance out the benefits, which arrive at times
after t, with the costs incurred at times (t∗2 (Λ0 ), t).
Similarly, by (iii), an increase in Λ0 strictly decreases the adoption At (Λ0 , G) of good
products (which is harmful), but also decreases the adoption At (Λ0 , B) of bad products
(which is beneficial), and welfare-neutrality obtains because these forces balance out in equilibrium. Figure 6 illustrates that the strict slow-down in the adoption of good products is
due to two effects: On the extensive margin, the increase in Λ0 pushes out t∗2 , i.e., prolongs
free-riding; on the intensive margin, the increase strictly drives down the growth rate of At
at all t < t∗2 (Λ0 ).
Point (iii) yields new testable implications relative to existing models of innovation adoption, suggesting, for example, that the proportion of adopters of an innovation may grow
more slowly in larger communities. This prediction is broadly consistent with Bandiera and
Rasul’s (2006) finding that we discussed in footnote 1: They document that farmers whose
network includes many adopters may be less likely to adopt initially themselves; thus, in
ε+r
Indeed, t∗1 is the first time at which the posterior exceeds the threshold p = ε+2r
and learning up to t∗1
is purely via the exogenous news source.
27
In an earlier version of this paper, the cooperative benchmark is shown to take an all-or-nothing form,
with no adoption below a cutoff belief ps and immediate adoption above ps . Relative to this, equilibrium
displays two inefficiencies: First, because ps < p, adoption generally begins too late. Second, when t∗1 < t∗2 ,
then once consumers begin to adopt, initial adoption is too low. See Frick and Ishii (2014), Section 5.3.
28
To define ex-ante welfare with myopic consumers, assume that consumers’ payoffs are discounted at some
arbitrary rate r > 0, but consumers behave myopically.
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Figure 6: The effect of increased opportunities for social learning on the adoption of a good product
under bad news (Λ̂0 > Λ0 ).

equilibrium, larger networks of farmers should feature lower percentages of adoption.
Finally, the logic behind the saturation effect relies crucially on partial adoption/informational free-riding. Correspondingly, as we show in Online Appendix B.5, there
is no saturation effect under good news: Since equilibrium adoption is all-or-nothing in this
case, increasing the potential for social learning speeds up learning at all times, which strictly
improves welfare (provided ε > 0). Likewise, under bad news learning, if initial opportunities
for social learning are so low that the equilibrium does not feature partial adoption, then
increasing Λ0 is strictly beneficial; see Online Appendix B.4.

4.3

More Social Learning Can Hurt: An Example

Assuming homogeneous consumers, we saw in Proposition 1 that, beyond a certain level, further increasing the potential for social learning is welfare-neutral in bad news environments.
More strongly, we now show that when consumers are heterogeneous, increased opportunities
for social learning can bring about Pareto-decreases in ex-ante welfare.
To illustrate this possibility, we consider bad news learning and introduce some heterogeneity in consumers’ patience levels. Suppose the population consists of two types of
consumers: There is a mass N̄0p of patient types with discount rate rp > 0 and a mass N̄0i of
impatient types with discount rate ri > rp . Assume for simplicity that there is no exogenous
news (ε = 0); similar arguments apply when ε > 0.
First, consider the economy consisting only of mass N̄0p of patient types (and no impatient
ρ+rp
), Lemma 2 implies that the equilibrium features partial
types). Then, provided p0 ∈ ( 21 , ρ+2r
p
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adoption whenever the social learning parameter λ exceeds a certain level λ̄p . Thus, for any
λ > λ̄p , the patient types are initially indifferent between adopting and waiting, and hence
their ex-ante payoff is 2p0 − 1.
Now, fix any λ̂ > λ > λ̄p , and consider the economy consisting of both types of consumers.
The following result shows that as long as the mass of impatient types is small, the patient
types’ ex-ante payoffs continue to be 2p0 − 1 under both λ and λ̂. However, the impatient
types’ payoffs are strictly lower under λ̂ than λ. Thus, the ex-ante payoff profile at λ̂ is
Pareto-dominated by the payoff profile at λ, despite the fact that λ̂ > λ entails greater
opportunities for social learning:
Proposition 2. Suppose learning is via bad news and ε = 0. Fix ri > rp > 0, and p0 ∈
ρ+rp
). Consider N̄0p > 0 and λ̂ > λ > λ̄p . There exists η > 0 such that whenever
( 21 , ρ+2r
p
the mass of impatient types N̄0i is at most η, then the patient types’ ex-ante payoffs satisfy
W0p (λ̂) = W0p (λ) = 2p0 −1, while the impatient types’ ex-ante payoffs satisfy W0i (λ̂) < W0i (λ).
The proof is in Online Appendix B.6. The basic idea is as follows. First, consider
the equilibrium adoption flows under λ and λ̂ in the game consisting solely of mass N̄0p of
patient types. What payoffs would a hypothetical impatient type ri (which does not exist
in this game) obtain if he behaved optimally when faced with these adoption flows? Since
the patient types are initially indifferent between adopting or delaying in both equilibria, a
monotonicity argument shows that the impatient type’s optimal strategy in both cases is to
adopt upon his first opportunity. Hence, the ex-ante payoff of the hypothetical impatient
type under the social learning rate γ ∈ {λ, λ̂} satisfies:
ˆ∞
W0i (γ)

ρe−(ri +ρ)τ

=

p0
γ
γ (2pτ − 1) dτ.
pτ

0

Given this, we invoke the non-monotonicity result for learning in Proposition 1 to show
that W0i (λ̂) < W0i (λ). Specifically, by Proposition 1, there exists some time t > t∗ := t∗2 (λ)
such that learning under λ̂ and λ is equally fast up to time t∗ , is strictly slower under λ̂
between t∗ and t, and is faster under λ̂ from time t on. For the patient types, the cost of
the deceleration in learning at times t ∈ (t∗ , t) and the benefit of the acceleration in learning
at times t > t exactly balance out, as W0p (λ̂) = W0p (λ) = 2p0 − 1. But this implies that the
hypothetical impatient type must be strictly hurt by these changes: Intuitively, relative to
a patient type, he weights the early costs more heavily than the later benefits.
To complete the proof, we show that as long as the mass of impatient types N̄0i > 0 is
sufficiently small, we still have W0i (λ̂) < W0i (λ) and W0p (λ̂) = W0p (λ). The first inequality
25

follows from a continuity argument. The second equality reflects the fact that when N̄0i is
small, patient types continue to partially adopt initially in both equilibria.
An assumption underlying this argument is that adoption opportunities are stochastic and
limited. Given that ρ is finite, impatient types may not receive any adoption opportunities for
a long time. This is the source of the above welfare loss, because if an impatient type obtains
his first adoption opportunity (e.g., arrives to the market) between t∗ and t, then at that
point, he has less information about the innovation under λ̂ than λ. If consumers were able to
adopt freely at any time, then impatient types would incur no loss, as all of them would adopt
at time 0 in both the λ and λ̂-equilibrium. Thus, Proposition 2 illustrates an interesting
interaction between heterogeneity and delays due to limited adoption opportunities.

5

Concluding Remarks

This paper develops a model of innovation adoption when consumers are forward-looking
and learning is social. Our analysis isolates the effect of purely informational incentives on
aggregate adoption dynamics, learning, and welfare. We highlight how qualitative and quantitative features of the learning environment shape these incentives, most importantly, by
determining whether or not there is informational free-riding in the form of partial adoption.
The presence or absence of partial adoption has observable implications, suggesting a novel
channel for two widespread adoption patterns—S-shaped and concave curves. Moreover,
partial adoption has important welfare implications, entailing that increased opportunities
for social learning need not benefit consumers and can be strictly harmful.
We conclude by briefly commenting on some modifications and extensions of our model:
Learning from the stock of adopters. In our model, the social learning component
of the signal arrival rate at time t, λNt , depends only on the flow of new adopters, Nt .
This effectively assumes that each adopter can generate a signal only once, namely at the
time of adoption. This seems an appropriate approximation for innovations such as medical
procedures, where “adoption” is a one-time event and the rate at which adopters generate
news about quality depreciates rapidly from the time of adoption. In contrast, for some
durable goods, it might be more natural to allow adopters to generate signals repeatedly
´t
over time, by letting signals at t arrive at rate λSt , where St := 0 Ns ds represents the stock
of adopters. This would produce similar results. Specifically, similar arguments can be used
to establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under both bad and good news.
The good news equilibrium is again all-or-nothing while, for appropriate parameters, the
bad news equilibrium again features a partial adoption region with behavior pinned down
t −1)
− λε . Finally, the partial adoption region again
by the indifference condition St = r(2p
λ(1−pt )
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exhibits convex growth in adoption levels.29
Stochastic adoption opportunities. In our model, adoption opportunities arrive
stochastically to each consumer at a Poisson rate ρ ∈ R+ . Section 2.1 motivated this assumption as capturing frictions in the form of cognitive or time constraints that prevent
consumers from contemplating the decision whether or not to adopt at every point in continuous time; the first adoption opportunity can also be interpreted as stochastic arrival to
the market. Of course, our analysis remains valid for arbitrarily large values of ρ, representing these frictions becoming vanishingly small. To see how equilibrium is affected as ρ grows
large, assume for simplicity that ε = 0 and p0 ∈ (1/2, 1). Then under good news, Theorem 2
continues to imply that equilibrium is all-or-nothing with cutoff posterior p∗ = 1/2, but as
ρ becomes arbitrarily large, the time t∗ it takes to reach p∗ becomes arbitrarily short, effectively approximating an initial mass point of adoption.30 Under bad news, for any p > 1/2,
Λ∗ (p) → 0 as ρ → ∞. Hence, by Theorem 1, there is an initial partial adoption region with
t −1)
, and as ρ → ∞, this partial adoption region grows
flow of adopters given by Nt = r(2p
λ(1−pt )
∗
longer and longer, but its duration t2 is bounded above.
More general signal processes. Finally, as in many applications of Poisson learning,
we have restricted attention to conclusive bad vs. good news signals. This made the equilibrium analysis quite tractable, yielding closed-form expressions for all key quantities and
allowing us to compute several comparative statics. While a careful investigation of more
general signal processes is beyond the scope of the paper, the analysis readily extends to
hybrid environments with two types of conclusive Poisson signals—bad news and good news
signals with respective arrival rates λB Nt and λG Nt . In particular, when λB > λG , the equilibrium is analogous to Theorem 1. Some of our insights also extend beyond environments
with conclusive signals: For example, it is worth noting that partial adoption relies crucially
on the possibility of news events that trigger discrete downward jumps in beliefs (although
such events need not conclusively signal bad quality). Without such events (e.g., when learning is based on inconclusive good news Poisson signals or Brownian motion), a similar logic
as in Section 3.3 shows that there cannot be continuous regions of partial adoption, because
29

The idea behind convexity is as follows: As in Section 3.2, indifference requires that the benefit of
avoiding a bad product when a breakdown occurs (i.e., (1 − pt )(λSt + ε)) equal the opportunity cost of
delaying adoption when no breakdown occurs (i.e., r(2pt − 1)). Since consumers grow more optimistic absent
breakdowns, this has two implications throughout the indifference region: (i) beliefs pt increase convexly,
because the growth rate of pt equals the instantaneous probability of a breakdown ( pṗtt = (1 − pt )(λSt + ε)),
and the latter must increase over time to balance out the increasing opportunity cost of delay; (ii) the stock
of adopters St = S(pt ) increases convexly as a function of beliefs, to ensure that breakdowns arrive at a rate
t −1)
that counterbalances the convex growth (w.r.t. beliefs) of the ratio r(2p
(1−pt ) between the opportunity cost
of delay and the probability of facing a bad product. Combining (i) and (ii), it follows that St , and hence
adoption levels, must increase convexly as a function of time.
30
This holds provided Λ0 is large enough that p0 +eΛp00(1−p0 ) < 12 , so that p∗ is reached eventually.
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a consumer who is willing to adopt cannot acquire decision-relevant information by delaying
his decision by an instant.31

A

Appendix: Main Proofs

This appendix presents the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorems 1–2. All remaining proofs are
in Online Appendix B.

A.1

Proof of Lemma 1 (Quasi-Single Crossing Property)

In this section, we prove Lemma 1. We will make use of the following five lemmas which
are proved in Online Appendix B.1. For an equilibrium adoption flow Nt≥0 , denote the
N
and the no-news posterior by pN
associated value to waiting by Wt≥0
t≥0 .
Lemma A.1. If Nt≥0 is an an equilibrium, then WtN is continuous in t.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that Nt≥0 is an equilibrium and that WtN < 2pN
t − 1 for some t > 0.
Then there exists some ν > 0 such that WtN is continuously differentiable in t on the interval
(t − ν, t + ν) and
N
N
ẆtN =(r + ρ + (εG + λG ρN̄t )pN
t + (εB + λB ρN̄t )(1 − pt ))Wt
ρ
N
− ρ(2pN
.
t − 1) − pτ (εG + λG ρN̄t )
ρ+r

Lemma A.3. Suppose that Nt≥0 is an equilibrium and that WtN > 2pN
t − 1 for some t > 0.
N
Then there exists some ν > 0 such that Wt is continuously differentiable in t on the interval
(t − ν, t + ν) and
N
N
N
ẆtN = (r + pN
t εG + (1 − pt )εB )Wt − pt εG

ρ
.
ρ+r

The final two lemmas focus on learning via bad news:
Lemma A.4. Let Nt≥0 be an equilibrium under bad news. Suppose that ε > 0 or p0 > 12 .
ρ
N
Then limt→∞ pN
t = µ(ε, Λ0 , p0 ) and limt→∞ Wt = ρ+r (2µ(ε, Λ0 , p0 ) − 1), where

µ(ε, Λ0 , p0 ) :=


1


31

if ε > 0,

p0
p0 +(1−p0 )e−Λ0

if ε = 0.

For this, we assume that there is no exogenous news. Details are available upon request.
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Lemma A.5. Suppose that learning is via bad news. Suppose that ε = 0 and p0 ≤ 12 . Then
the unique equilibrium satisfies Nt = 0 for all t.
Henceforth we drop the superscript N from W and p.

Proof of Lemma 1 under Good News:
Let ε = εG ≥ 0 = εB and λ = λG > 0 = λB .
Step 1: Wt = 2pt − 1 =⇒ Wτ ≥ 2pτ − 1 for all τ ≥ t:
Suppose Wt = 2pt − 1 at some time t and suppose for a contradiction that at some time
0
s > t, we have Ws0 < 2ps0 − 1. Let
s∗ = sup{s < s0 : Ws = 2ps − 1}.
By continuity, s∗ < s0 , Ws∗ = 2ps∗ − 1, and Ws < 2ps − 1 for all s ∈ (s∗ , s0 ). Then by
Lemma A.2, the right hand derivative of Ws − (2ps − 1) at s∗ exists and satisfies:
lim∗ Ẇs − 2ṗs = r(2ps∗ − 1) + ps∗ ε + λρN̄s∗

s↓s



r
> 0.
ρ+r

This implies that for some s ∈ (s∗ , s0 ) sufficiently close to s∗ we have Ws > 2ps − 1, which is
a contradiction.
Step 2: Wt > 2pt − 1 =⇒ Wτ > 2pτ − 1 for all τ > t:
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists s0 > t such that Ws0 = 2ps0 − 1. Let
s∗ = inf{s > t : Ws = 2ps − 1}.
By continuity, s∗ > t, Ws∗ = 2ps∗ − 1, and Ws > 2ps − 1 for all s ∈ (t, s∗ ). Note that ps∗ ≥ 21 ,
because Ws∗ is bounded below by 0. Moreover, by Lemma A.3 the left-hand derivative of
Ws − (2ps − 1) at s∗ exists and is given by:
lim∗ Ẇs − 2ṗs = r(2ps∗ − 1) + ps∗

s↑s

r
ε.
ρ+r

If ε > 0, this is strictly positive, implying that for some s ∈ (t, s∗ ) sufficiently close to s∗ ,
we have Ws < 2ps − 1, which is a contradiction. If ε = 0, then for all s ∈ (t, s∗ ), we have
∗
∗
ps∗ = ps and Ws = e−r(s −s) Ws∗ = e−r(s −s) (2ps∗ − 1) ≤ 2ps∗ − 1. Thus, Ws ≤ 2ps − 1, again
contradicting Ws > 2ps − 1.
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Proof of Lemma 1 under Bad News:
Let ε = εB ≥ 0 = εG and λ = λB > 0 = λG . If ε = 0 and p0 ≤ 12 , then by Lemma A.5
Nt = 0 for all t, so the proof of Lemma 1 is obvious. We now prove the theorem under the
assumption that either ε > 0 or p0 > 21 .
Step 1: Wt = 2pt − 1 =⇒ Wτ ≤ 2pτ − 1 for all τ ≥ t:
Suppose that Wt = 2pt − 1 and suppose for a contradiction that Ws0 > 2ps0 − 1 for some
s > t. Let s := inf{s > s0 : Wt ≤ 2ps − 1} < ∞, since by Lemma A.4 limt→∞ 2pt − 1 >
limt→∞ Wt . Let s := sup{s < s0 : Ws ≤ 2ps − 1}. Then s < s, Ws = 2ps − 1, Ws = 2ps − 1,
and Ws > 2ps − 1 for all s ∈ (s, s). Lemma A.3 together with the fact that Ns = 0 for all
s ∈ (s, s) implies the following two limits:
0



d
Ls := lim Ẇs − (2ps − 1) = (r + (1 − ps )ε)(2ps − 1) − 2ps (1 − ps )ε
s↓s
ds


d
Ls := lim Ẇs − (2ps − 1) = (r + (1 − ps )ε)(2ps − 1) − 2ps (1 − ps )ε.
s↑s
ds
Because Ws > 2ps − 1 for all s ∈ (s, s), we need Ls ≥ 0 and Ls ≤ 0. Rearranging this
implies:
r(2ps − 1) ≥ (1 − ps )ε
and
r(2ps − 1) ≤ (1 − ps )ε.
But if ε > 0, then ps > ps , so this is impossible. On the other hand, if ε = 0 and p0 > 21 ,
then for all s ∈ (s, s), we have that ps = ps > 12 and Ws = e−r(s−s) Ws . Since Ws = 2ps − 1,
this implies Ws = e−r(s−s) (2ps − 1) < 2ps − 1, contradicting Ws > 2ps − 1. This completes
the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: Wt < 2pt − 1 =⇒ Wτ < 2pτ − 1 for all τ > t:
Suppose that Wt < 2pt − 1, let s := inf{s0 > t : Ws0 ≥ 2ps0 − 1}, and suppose for a
contradiction that s < ∞. By continuity, Wτ < 2pτ − 1 for all τ ∈ [t, s) and Ws = 2ps − 1.
Furthermore, by Lemma A.4, there exists some s ≥ s such that 2ps −1 = Ws and 2ps −1 > Ws
for all s > s. Lemma A.2 implies the following two limits:



d
Hs := lim Ẇs − (2ps − 1) = r(2ps − 1) − ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps )
s↑s
ds



d
Hs := lim Ẇs − (2ps − 1) = r(2ps − 1) − ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps ).
s↓s
ds
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As usual, because Ws < 2ps − 1 for all s ∈ (t, s) and for all s > s, we must have Hs ≥ 0 and
Hs ≤ 0. But since ps ≥ ps , this is only possible if s = s =: s∗ and Hs∗ = Hs = Hs = 0.
Thus,

r(2ps∗ − 1) = ε + λρN̄s∗ (1 − ps∗ ).
Now consider any s ∈ [t, s∗ ). Because ps ≤ ps∗ and N̄s ≥ N̄s∗ , we must have

r(2ps − 1) ≤ ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps ).
Combining this with the fact that Ws < 2ps − 1 yields


rWs < ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps ) < (2ps − Ws ) ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps ) + ρ(2ps − 1 − Ws ).
Rearranging we obtain:

0 < −rWs + ρ(2ps − 1 − Ws ) + (2ps − Ws ) ε + λρN̄s (1 − ps ).
d
(2ps − 1) − Ẇs . But then for
By Lemma A.2, the right-hand side is precisely the derivative ds
∗
all s ∈ [t, s ), 2ps − 1 > Ws and 2ps − 1 − Ws is strictly increasing, contradicting continuity
and the fact that 2ps∗ − 1 = Ws∗ .


A.2

Proof of Theorem 1 (Bad News Equilibrium)

In this section we prove Theorem 1. Recall the following beliefs defined in Section 3.2:
(ε + r)(r + ρ)
,
2(ε + r)(r + ρ) − ερ
ε+r
p :=
,
ε + 2r
ρ+r
p] :=
.
ρ + 2r
p :=

Let p∗ := min{p, p] }. Define the function G : [0, 1] × R+ → R by
ˆ∞
G(p, Λ) :=

ρe

−(r+ρ)τ



−(ετ +Λ(1−e−ρτ ))

p − (1 − p)e



dτ, for all (p, Λ) ∈ [0, 1] × R+ .

0

We extend G to the domain [0, 1] × (R+ ∪ {+∞}) by defining:
G(p, +∞) :=
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ρ
p.
ρ+r

Finally, define the non-decreasing function Λ∗ : [0, 1] → R+ ∪ {+∞} by



Λ∗ (p) = 0



if p ≤ p,

2p − 1 = G(p, Λ∗ (p)) if p ∈ (p, p] )



Λ∗ (p) = +∞
p ≥ p] .
As discussed in the main text, for p ∈ (p, p] ), N̄ ∗ (p) := λ1 Λ∗ (p) has the following property:
If N̄ ∗ (p) consumers remain and if all these remaining consumers adopt at their first future
opportunity, then a consumer with current posterior p is indifferent between immediate
adoption and adoption at his next opportunity (absent breakdowns).
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds in three steps. Suppose that Nt≥0 is an equilibrium
with associated cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2 as defined by (2). We first show in Lemma A.6 that
if t∗1 < t∗2 , then at all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ), Nt is pinned down by a simple ODE. Second, Lemma A.7
provides a characterization of t∗1 and t∗2 in terms of the evolution of (pt , Λt ). Given these two
steps, it is easy to see that if an equilibrium exists, it is unique and must take the Markovian
form in (4) of Theorem 1. Finally, to verify equilibrium existence, Lemma A.8 shows that
the adoption flow implied by (4) is feasible.
A.2.1

Characterization of Adoption between t∗1 and t∗2

Lemma A.6. Suppose Nt≥0 is an equilibrium with associated no-news posterior pt≥0 and
cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2 as defined by Equation (2). Suppose that t∗1 < t∗2 . Then at all times
t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ),
r(2pt − 1) ε
Nt =
− .
λ(1 − pt )
λ
Proof. By definition of t∗1 and t∗2 and Lemma 1, we have 2pt − 1 = WtN at all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ).
Because pt is weakly increasing, this implies that pt and WtN are differentiable at almost all
t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) (with respect to Lebesgue measure).
Using again the fact that 2pt − 1 = WtN at all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) we obtain for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ):
WtN



´ t∗
− t 2 (ε+λNs )ds
=e
pt + (1 − pt )e
(2pt∗2 − 1)


´ t∗
−r(t∗2 −t)
− t 2 (ε+λNs )ds
=e
pt − (1 − pt )e
,
−r(t∗2 −t)

(7)

where the second equality follows from Equation (1). Consider any t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) at which WtN
and pt are differentiable. Combining the fact that ṗt = pt (1 − pt )(ε + λNt ) with (7), we
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obtain:
ẆtN = (r + (ε + λNt )(1 − pt )) WtN .

(8)

Furthermore, because WtN = 2pt − 1 for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ), we must have:
ẆtN = 2ṗt = 2pt (1 − pt )(ε + λNt ).

(9)

Combining (8), (9) and the fact that WtN = 2pt − 1 then yields
Nt =

r(2pt − 1) ε
−
λ(1 − pt )
λ

for almost all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ). By continuity of pt and right-continuity of Nt , the identity must

then hold for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ).
As an immediate corollary of Lemma A.6 we obtain:
Corollary A.1. The posterior at all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) evolves according to the following ordinary
differential equation:
ṗt = rpt (2pt − 1).
Given some initial condition p = pt∗1 , this ordinary differential equation admits a unique
solution, given by:
pt∗1
pt =
.
∗
2pt∗1 − er(t−t1 ) (2pt∗1 − 1)
A.2.2

Characterization of Cutoff Times

Lemma A.7. Let Nt≥0 be an equilibrium with corresponding no-news posterior pt≥0 and
cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2 as defined by Equation (2), and let Λt≥0 := λN̄t≥0 describe the evolution
of the economy’s potential for social learning. Then
(i). t∗2 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Λt < Λ∗ (pt )}; and
(ii). t∗1 = min{t∗2 , sup{t ≥ 0 : pt < p∗ }}.32
Proof. We first prove both bullet points under the assumption that either ε > 0 or p0 > 12 .
Note that in this case Lemma A.4 implies that limt→∞ 2pt −1 > limt→∞ Wt , whence t∗2 < +∞.
Moreover, pt is strictly increasing for all t > 0.
For the first bullet point, note that by definition of t∗2 := sup{t ≥ 0 : Nt < ρN̄t }, we have
that 2pt − 1 ≥ Wt = G(pt , Λt ) for all t ≥ t∗2 . This implies that Λt∗2 ≤ Λ∗ (pt∗2 ). Moreover,
32

By convention, if {t ≥ 0 : pt < p∗ = 21 } = ∅, then sup{t ≥ 0 : pt < p∗ = 21 } := 0.
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for all t > t∗2 , Λt < Λt∗2 and pt > pt∗2 , so since Λ∗ is non-decreasing we have Λt < Λ∗ (pt ).
Suppose that 0 < t∗2 . Then by continuity we must have 2pt∗2 − 1 = Wt∗2 = G(pt∗2 , Λt∗2 ) and
so Λt∗2 = Λ∗ (pt∗2 ). But since for all s < t∗2 we have Λs ≥ Λt∗2 and ps < pt∗2 , this implies
Λs ≥ Λ∗ (ps ). This establishes (i).
For (ii), it suffices to prove the following three claims:
(a) If t∗2 > 0, then pt∗2 < p] .
(b) If t∗1 > 0, then pt∗1 ≤ p.
(c) If t∗1 < t∗2 , then pt∗1 ≥ p.
Indeed, given (a) and (b), we have that if 0 < t∗1 = t∗2 , then pt∗1 ≤ p∗ . Given (a)-(c), we have
that if 0 < t∗1 < t∗2 , then pt∗1 = p = p∗ . If 0 = t∗1 < t∗2 , then (c) implies that p0 ≥ p = p∗ . In
all three cases (ii) readily follows. Finally, if 0 = t∗1 = t∗2 , then there is nothing to prove.
For claim (a), recall from the above that if t∗2 > 0, then Λt∗2 = Λ∗ (pt∗2 ), whence pt∗2 < p]
because Λ∗ (p] ) = +∞.
For claim (b), note that if t∗1 > 0, then for all t < t∗1 , we have Nt = 0. Then for all t < t∗1 ,
Wt ≥ 2pt − 1 and by the proof of Lemma A.3, Ẇt = (r + (1 − pt )ε)Wt . Since Wt∗1 = 2pt∗1 − 1,
we must then have
0 ≥ lim∗ Ẇτ − 2ṗτ = (r + (1 − pt∗1 )ε)(2pt∗1 − 1) − 2pt∗1 (1 − pt∗1 )ε
τ ↑t1

= r(2pt∗1 − 1) − ε(1 − pt∗1 ),
which implies that
pt∗1 ≤

ε+r
=: p.
ε + 2r

Finally, for claim (c), note that if t∗1 < t∗2 , then Lemma A.6 implies that for all τ ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ),
0 ≤ Nτ =

r(2pτ − 1) ε
− .
λ(1 − pτ )
λ

This implies that for all τ ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ),
pτ ≥

ε+r
=: p,
ε + 2r

and hence by continuity pt∗1 ≥ p as claimed. This proves the lemma when either ε > 0
or p0 > 12 . Finally, if ε = 0 and p0 ≤ 21 , then by Lemma A.5 Nt = 0 for all t. Thus,
by definition, t∗1 = t∗2 = +∞. Moreover, pt = p0 ≤ 12 and Λt = Λ0 > 0 for all t, so
inf{t : Λt < Λ∗ (pt ) = 0} = sup{t : pt < p∗ = 21 } = +∞, as required.
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Given Lemmas A.6 and A.7, it is immediate that if an equilibrium exists, then it must
take the form of the adoption flow given by Equation (4) in Theorem 1. Moreover, it is easy
to see that given initial parameters, Equation (4) uniquely pins down the times t∗1 and t∗2 as
well as the joint evolution of pt and Nt at all times (we elaborated on this in the main text),
and that whenever t∗1 < t∗2 < +∞, then 2pt − 1 = Wt for all t ∈ [t∗1 , t∗2 ]. Provided feasibility
is satisfied, it is then easy to check that this adoption flow constitutes an equilibrium.
A.2.3

Feasibility

It remains to check feasibility, which is non-trivial only at times t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ).
Lemma A.8. Suppose Nt≥0 is an adoption flow satisfying Equation (4) in Theorem 1 such
that t∗1 < t∗2 . Then for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ), Nt ≤ ρN̄t .
Proof. It suffices to show that
lim∗ Nt ≤ ρN̄t∗2 .
t↑t2

The lemma then follows immediately since ρN̄t − Nt is strictly decreasing in t at all times
in (t∗1 , t∗2 ).
To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that ρN̄t∗2 < limt↑t∗2 Nt . By continuity this
means that there exists some ν > 0 such that ρN̄t < Nt for all t ∈ (t∗2 − ν, t∗2 ). Note that from
the indifference condition at t∗2 , we have that 2pt∗2 − 1 = G(pt∗2 , λN̄t∗2 ). Furthermore because
Λ∗ (pt ) is increasing in t, 2pt − 1 < G(pt , Λt ) for all t < t∗2 .
Since at all t ∈ (t∗2 − ν, t∗2 ), Nt > ρN̄t , this implies that Wt > G(pt , Λt ) > 2pt − 1. But
this is a contradiction since we already checked that the described adoption flow satisfies the

condition that Wt = 2pt − 1 for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ).

A.3

Proof of Theorem 2 (Good News Equilibrium)

Theorem 2 follows immediately from the following two lemmas:
Lemma A.9. Let Nt≥0 be an equilibrium with associated cutoff times t∗1 and t∗2 given by
Equation (3). Then t∗1 = t∗2 =: t∗ .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that t∗1 < t∗2 . From the definition of these cutoffs and
Lemma 1, we have that 2pt − 1 = Wt for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ). Then for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) and
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∆ ∈ (0, t∗2 − t) we have:
t+∆
ˆ
´τ
ρ
dτ +
Wt =pt
(ε + λNτ ) e− t (ε+λNs )ds e−r(τ −t)
ρ+r

 t
´
− tt+∆ (ε+λNs )ds
e−r∆ (2pt+∆ − 1) ,
(1 − pt ) + pt e

where the first term represents a breakthrough arriving at some τ ∈ (t, t + ∆) in which case
ρ
consumers adopt from then on, yielding a payoff of e−r(τ −t) ρ+r
; and the second term represents no breakthrough arriving prior to t + ∆ in which case, due to indifference, consumers’
payoff can be written as e−r∆ (2pt+∆ − 1).
Note that we must have pt ≥ 12 on (t∗1 , t∗2 ), since Wt is bounded below by 0. Moreover, by
the definition of t∗2 , there exists t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗2 ) such that Nt > 0. By right-continuity of N , we
can pick ∆ ∈ (0, t∗2 − t) sufficiently small such that Nτ > 0 for all τ ∈ (t, t + ∆). Then,
t+∆
ˆ
´τ
ρ
dτ
pt
(ε + λNτ ) e− t (ε+λNs )ds e−r(τ −t)
ρ+r
t
t+∆


ˆ
´
´
ρ
− tτ (ε+λNs )ds ρ
− tt+∆ (ε+λNs )ds
< pt
(ε + λNτ ) e
dτ = pt 1 − e
.
ρ+r
ρ+r
t

This implies that


´ t+∆



ρ
Wt < pt 1 − e t
ρ+r


´ t+∆
− t
(ε+λNs )ds
+ (1 − pt ) + pt e
(2pt+∆ − 1)

 

´ t+∆
´ t+∆
≤ pt 1 − e− t (ε+λNs )ds + (1 − pt ) + pt e− t (ε+λNs )ds (2pt+∆ − 1)
−

(ε+λNs )ds

= 2pt − 1,
where the final equality comes from Bayesian updating. This contradicts Wt = 2pt − 1.
Thus, t∗1 = t∗2 .

Lemma A.10. Let Nt≥0 be an equilibrium with corresponding cutoff time t∗ := t∗1 = t∗2 and
no-news posterior pt≥0 . Then
pt ≤ p∗ ⇔ t ≥ t∗ ,
where
p∗ =

(ε + r)(r + ρ)
.
2(ε + r)(r + ρ) − ερ
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Proof. Define

ˆ

∞

(ε + λNt+τ ) e−(ετ +

Ht := pt
0

´ t+τ
t

λNs ds)

ρ −rτ
e dτ.
r+ρ

Thus, Ht represents a consumer’s expected value to waiting at time t given that from t
on he adopts only if there has been a breakthrough and given that the population’s flow
of adoption follows Ns≥0 . By optimality of Wt , we must have Ht ≤ Wt for all t. For any
posterior p ∈ (0, 1), let
ˆ

∞

εe−ετ

H(p, 0) := p
0

ρ −rτ
ερ
e dτ = p
.
r+ρ
(ε + r)(r + ρ)

That is, H(p, 0) represents a consumer’s expected value to waiting at posterior p, given that
he adopts only once there has been a breakthrough and given that breakthroughs are only
generated exogenously.
Now note that by definition of t∗ , Nt > 0 if and only if t < t∗ . This implies that
H(pt , 0) < Ht if t < t∗ and H(pt , 0) = Ht = Wt if t ≥ t∗ ; moreover, 2pt − 1 ≥ Wt if t < t∗
(ε+r)(r+ρ)
and 2pt − 1 ≤ Wt if t ≥ t∗ . Finally, note that p∗ := 2(ε+r)(r+ρ)−ερ
has the property that
2p − 1 ≤ H(p, 0) if and only if p ≤ p∗ .
Combining these observations, we have that if t < t∗ , then 2pt − 1 ≥ Wt ≥ Ht > H(pt , 0),
so pt > p∗ . And if t ≥ t∗ , then 2pt − 1 ≤ Wt = H(pt , 0), so pt ≤ p∗ , as claimed.
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Online Appendix to “Innovation Adoption by
Forward-Looking Social Learners”
Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii

B
B.1

Omitted Proofs and Results
Proofs of Lemmas A.1–A.5

Proof of Lemma A.1: Note the following recursive formulations for WtN . If learning is via bad
news, then

ˆ
WtN

=

∞

ρe−(r+ρ)(s−t)

t



pN
t
N
max 2pN
s − 1 , Ws
N
ps

ds.

If learning is via good news, WtN satisfies:
ˆ
WtN

=

∞

ρe

−(r+ρ)(s−t)





´
− ts (ε+λNk ) dk
pN
1
−
e
t

t

+

−
pN
t e

´s
t

(ε+λNk ) dk

pN
s

max




N
2pN
s − 1 , Ws


ds.

From this it is immediate that WtN is continuous in t.



N
Proof of Lemma A.2: Suppose that WtN < 2pN
t − 1 for some t > 0. By Lemma A.1 Wt is
N
N
continuous in t, and so is 2pN
t − 1. Hence there exists ν > 0 such that Wτ < 2pτ − 1 for all

τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν). Because N is an equilibrium this implies that Nτ = ρN̄τ for all τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν).
Thus, Nτ is continuous at all τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν). From this it is immediate that WτN is continuously
differentiable in τ for all for all τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν), because we have that

WτN

ˆt+ν


´
´
− τs (εG +λG Nx )dx
N − τs (εB +λB Nx )dx
=
ρe−(ρ+r)(s−τ ) pN
e
−
(1
−
p
)e
ds
τ
τ
τ



´
´
− τt+ν (εG +λG Nx )dx
N − τt+ν (εB +λB Nx )dx
N
+ e−(r+ρ)(t+ν−τ ) pN
e
+
(1
−
p
)e
Wt+ν
τ
τ
ˆt+ν


´
− τs (εG +λG Nx )dx
+
ρe−(ρ+r)(s−τ ) pN
1
−
e
ds
τ
τ



´
− τt+ν (εG +λG Nx )dx
+ e−(r+ρ)(t+ν−τ ) pN
1
−
e
τ

ρ
.
ρ+r

The derivative of WτN can be computed using Ito’s Lemma for processes with jumps. Given the
perfect Poisson learning structure, the derivation is simple and we provide it here for completeness.
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As above, for any ∆ < t + ν − τ we can rewrite WτN as
τˆ+∆



´
´
− τs (εB +λB Nx )dx
− τs (εG +λG Nx )dx
ds
− (1 − pN
ρe−(ρ+r)(s−τ ) pN
τ )e
τ e

WτN =
τ

−(r+ρ)∆

+e



−
pN
τ e

´ τ +∆
τ

(εG +λG Nx )dx

−
+ (1 − pN
τ )e

´ τ +∆
τ

(εB +λB Nx )dx



WτN+∆

τˆ+∆



´s
ρe−(r+ρ)(s−τ ) pN
1 − e− τ (εG +λG Nx )dx ds
τ

+
τ



´
− ττ +∆ (εG +λG Nx )dx
1
−
e
+ e−(r+ρ)∆ pN
τ

ρ
.
ρ+r

Since this is true for all ∆ ∈ (0, t + ν − τ ), the right hand side of this identity, which we denote R∆ ,
is continuously differentiable with respect to ∆ and satisfies
and since ẆτN = lim∆→0

d
N
dτ Wτ +∆

d
d∆ R∆

≡ 0. Taking the limit as ∆ → 0

by continuous differentiability, we then obtain:

ẆτN = (r + ρ + (εG + λG Nτ )pτ + (εB + λB Nτ )(1 − pτ ))WτN
− ρ(2pτ − 1) − pτ (εG + λG Nτ )

ρ
.
ρ+r

Plugging in Nτ = ρN̄τ yields the desired expression.



Proof of Lemma A.3: The proof of continuous differentiability of WtN follows along the same
lines as in the proof of Lemma A.2. Lemma A.1 again implies that if WtN > 2pN
t − 1, then there
exists ν > 0 such that WτN > 2pN
τ − 1 for all τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν). By the definition of equilibrium,
Nτ = 0 for all τ ∈ (t − ν, t + ν).
Hence, WτN satisfies


N
−εG (t+ν−τ )
N −εB (t+ν−τ )
e
+
(1
−
p
)e
Wt+ν
WτN = e−r(t+ν−τ ) pN
τ
τ
+

pN
τ

ˆt+ν
εG e−(εG +r)s

ρ
ds.
ρ+r

τ

From this it is again immediate that WτN is continuously differentiable in τ .
To compute the derivative, we proceed as above, rewriting WτN as
τˆ+∆

WτN

−r∆

=e

−εG ∆
pN
τ e

+ (1 −

−εB ∆
pN
τ )e



N
Wt+∆

εG e−(εG +r)s

+ pτ

ρ
ds
ρ+r

τ

for any ∆ < t + ν − τ .
Differentiating both sides of the above equality with respect to ∆ and taking the limit as ∆ → 0,

2

we obtain:
N
N
N
ẆτN = (r + pN
τ εG + (1 − pτ )εB )Wτ − pτ εG

ρ
,
ρ+r


as claimed.

Proof of Lemma A.4: Consider first the case in which ε > 0. Then trivially pN
t → 1 as t → ∞.

ρ
ρ
ρ
N
N
But for any t, ρ+r 2pN
t − 1 ≤ Wt ≤ ρ+r . This implies that limt→∞ Wt = ρ+r as claimed.
Now suppose that ε = 0 and p0 > 1/2. Then note that WtN ≤ 2pN
t − 1 for all t: Indeed,
N
N
suppose that WtN > 2pN
t − 1 for some t. We can’t have that Ws > 2ps − 1 for all s ≥ t, since

otherwise WtN = 0, contradicting WtN > 2pN
t − 1 > 0. But then we can find s > t such that
N
N
0
0
WsN = 2pN
s − 1 and Ws0 > 2ps0 − 1 for all s ∈ (t, s). This implies Ns0 = 0 for all s , and hence
−r(s−t) (2pN −1), again contradicting W N > 2pN −1 > 0.
WtN = e−r(s−t) WsN = e−r(s−t) (2pN
s −1) = e
t
t
t
´
´
t
t
∗
∗
N
N
Let N := limt→∞ 0 Ns ds = supt 0 Ns ds ≤ N̄0 . Let p := limt→∞ pt = supt pt . For any

ν > 0 we can find t∗ such that whenever t > t∗ , then e−λ

´t

t∗

Ns ds

N
> 1 − ν. Because 2pN
t − 1 ≥ Wt

for all t, we can then rewrite the value to waiting at time t as:
ˆ∞
WtN

=



´
N −λ tτ Ns ds
dτ
ρe−(r+ρ)τ pN
t − (1 − pt )e

t

≤


ρ
N
pN
t − (1 − pt )(1 − ν)
r+ρ

for all t > t∗ . Moreover, by optimality WtN ≥

ρ
N
ρ+r (2pt

− 1) for all t, so combining we have

ρ
ρ
(2p∗ − 1) ≤ lim inf WtN ≤ lim sup WtN ≤
(p∗ − (1 − p∗ )(1 − ν)) .
t→∞
t→∞
ρ+r
r+ρ
Since this is true for all ν > 0, it follows that
lim WtN =

t→∞

ρ
(2p∗ − 1).
r+ρ

But the above is strictly less than 2p∗ − 1, so for all t sufficiently large we must have 2pN
t −
1 > WtN . Then for all t sufficiently large, we have Nt = ρN̄t . Thus, N ∗ = N̄0 and therefore
p∗ = µ(ε, Λ0 , p0 ).



Proof of Lemma A.5: Suppose that Nt≥0 is an equilibrium and suppose for a contradiction that
t∗1 := inf{t : Nt > 0} < ∞. Pick t ≥ t∗1 such that Nt > 0. By right-continuity of N , we have Nτ > 0
for all τ > t sufficiently close to t. This implies that
ˆ

∞

ρe
t∗1

−(r+ρ)(s−t)



pN
t∗1

− (1 −

−
pN
t∗1 )e

´s

t∗
1

λNk dk



ds >


ρ  N
2pt∗1 − 1 ≥ 2pN
t∗1 − 1,
r+ρ

(10)

1
where the second inequality holds because pN
t∗ = p0 ≤ 2 . But the integral on the left-hand side is
1

3

the expected payoff at time t∗1 to adopting at the first opportunity in the future, conditional on no
breakdown having occurred prior to this opportunity. By optimality of the value to waiting, this is
weakly less than WtN∗ . Hence, (10) implies that WtN∗ > 2pt∗1 − 1. By continuity of W N and pN , it
1

1

follows that for all s ≥ t∗1 sufficiently close to t∗1 , WsN > 2pN
s − 1 and hence Ns = 0, contradicting
the definition of t∗1 .
This leaves N ≡ 0 as the only candidate equilibrium. In this case WtN = 0 ≥ 2p0 − 1 = 2pN
t −1
for all t, so this is indeed an equilibrium.

B.2



Proof of Lemma 2

Proof. Assume that p0 ∈ (0, p] ) and impose Conditions 1 and 2. Define Λ0 := max{Λ∗ (p0 ), Λ∗ (p)}.
Consider any Λ0 and let t∗i := t∗i (Λ0 ) for i = 1, 2. We show that t∗1 < t∗2 if and only if Λ0 > Λ0 .
Suppose first that Λ0 > Λ0 . By the proof of the first part of Lemma A.7, we must have t∗2 > 0
and Λt∗2 = Λ∗ (pt∗2 ). If t∗1 = t∗2 =: t∗ , then by claims (a) and (b) in the proof of Lemma A.7, we must
have pt∗ ≤ p. But combining these statements, we get
Λt∗ = Λ0 > Λ∗ (p) ≥ Λ∗ (pt∗ ) = Λt∗ ,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose conversely that t∗1 < t∗2 . Then by the proof of Lemma A.7, we have that Λ∗ (pt∗1 ) <
Λt∗1 = Λ0 . That proof also implies that if 0 < t∗1 < t∗2 , then pt∗1 = p ≥ p0 ; and if 0 = t∗1 < t∗2 , then
pt∗1 = p0 ≥ p. Thus, either way Λ0 > Λ0 , as claimed.

B.3



Proof of Proposition 1 (Saturation Effect under Bad News)

Fix r, ρ, ε, and p0 . Suppose Λ0 is such that t∗1 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ0 ). By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, this
means that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, p0 < p] , and Λ0 > Λ0 , where Λ0 := max{Λ∗ (p0 ), Λ∗ (p)}
is as given by Lemma 2. Consider any Λ̂0 > Λ0 .

B.3.1

Proof of part (i) (welfare neutrality)

Write Λ10 := Λ0 and Λ20 := Λ̂0 , with corresponding cutoff times ti1 and ti2 , value to waiting Wti , and
no-news posteriors pit for i = 1, 2. Since t11 < t12 and Λ20 > Λ10 > Λ0 , Lemma 2 implies t21 < t22 .
Moreover, by the proof of Lemma A.7, we have max{p0 , p} = p1t1 = p2t2 . Because Nti = 0 for all
t < ti1 for both i = 1, 2, this implies that t11 = t21 = t1 . Then

1

1

Wt21 = 2p2t1 − 1 = 2p1t1 − 1 = Wt11 .
But since there is no adoption until t1 , we have W0i = e−rt1

pt1
i
p0 Wt1

for i = 1, 2, whence W01 = W02 ,


as claimed.
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B.3.2

Proof of part (ii) (non-monotonicity of learning)

We first prove the following lemma:
ˆ > Λ = λN̄ > Λ , with corresponding equilibrium flows of
Lemma B.1. Suppose that Λ̂0 = λ̂N̄
0
0
0
0
adoption N̂t≥0 and Nt≥0 . Then
(i). t∗1 (Λ0 ) = t∗1 (Λ̂0 ).
(ii). 0 < t∗2 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ̂0 ).
(iii). For all t < t∗2 (Λ0 ), λNt = λ̂N̂t .
Proof. For (i), note that by the proof of Lemma A.7, time t∗1 under each of Λ0 and Λ̂0 is pinned
Λ̂0
0
down by the fact that max{p0 , p} = pΛ
t∗ (Λ0 ) = p ∗

t1 (Λ̂0 )

1

. Because up to time t∗1 learning is purely

exogenous under both Λ0 and Λ̂0 , this immediately implies that t∗1 (Λ0 ) = t∗1 (Λ̂0 ).
For (ii) and (iii), note first that by Lemma 2, we have t∗2 (Λ̂0 ), t∗2 (Λ0 ) > 0.

Let t∗2 =

min{t∗2 (Λ̂0 ), t∗2 (Λ0 )}. Then because t∗1 (Λ0 ) = t∗1 (Λ̂0 ), the ODE in Corollary A.1 implies that at
Λ̂0
∗
0
all times t < t∗2 , we have pΛ
t = pt = pt . By Lemma A.6, this implies that for all t < t2 ,

λNt = λ̂N̂t .

(11)

Note that Equation 11 implies that
ˆ
Λt∗2 = Λ0 −

t∗2

ˆ
λNt dt < Λ̂0 −

0

t∗2

0

λ̂N̂t dt = Λ̂t∗2 .

Λ̂0
∗
∗
∗
0
Because pΛ
t∗ = pt∗ , Lemma A.7 implies that t2 = t2 (Λ0 ) < t2 (Λ̂0 ).
2

2

From this and Equation 11, it is then immediate that λNt = λ̂N̂t for all t < t∗2 (Λ0 ).



Now we prove part (ii) of Proposition 1. By Lemma B.1, t∗ := t∗2 (Λ0 ) < t∗2 (Λ̂0 ), λNt = λ̂N̂t ,
Λ̂0
∗
0
and pΛ
t = pt for all t ≤ t , which proves the first bullet.

For the second bullet, we claim that there exists some ν > 0 such that at all times t ∈ (t∗ , t∗ +ν),
Λ̂0
0
we have pΛ
t > pt . To see this, we prove the following inequality for the equilibrium corresponding

to Λ0 :
lim∗ λNt < lim∗ λNt .
t↑t

t↓t

(12)

In other words, there is a discontinuity in the equilibrium flow of adoption at time t∗ . Indeed, because
Nt = ρN̄t for all t ≥ t∗ and by continuity of N̄t , feasibility implies that limt↑t∗ λNt ≤ limt↓t∗ λNt .
Suppose for a contradiction that limt↑t∗ λNt = limt↓t∗ λNt := λNt∗ . Then λNt∗ = λ̂N̂t∗ . Moreover,
∗

for all t > t∗ , we have λNt = ρΛt∗ e−ρ(t−t ) , which is strictly decreasing in t. On the other hand,
λ̂N̂t satisfies


 r(2p̂t −1) − ε
(1−p̂t )
λ̂N̂t =
∗
ρΛ ∗
e−ρ(t−t2 (Λ̂0 ))
t2 (Λ̂0 )

5

if t ∈ [t∗ , t∗2 (Λ̂0 ))
if t ≥ t∗2 (Λ̂0 ).

Thus, for t ∈ [t∗ , t∗2 (Λ̂0 )), λ̂N̂t is strictly increasing in t. This implies that λ̂N̂t > λNt for all
t ∈ [t∗ , t∗2 (Λ̂0 )). But then by Equation 1,
pΛ̂∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

> pΛ∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

,

which by Lemma A.7 implies
Λ̂t∗ (Λ̂0 ) = Λ∗ (pΛ̂∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

2

) > Λ∗ (pΛ∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

) > Λt∗ (Λ̂0 ) .
2

This yields that for all t ≥ t∗2 (Λ̂0 ))
∗

∗

λ̂N̂t = ρe−ρ(t−t2 (Λ̂0 ) Λ̂t∗ (Λ̂0 ) > ρe−ρ(t−t2 (Λ̂0 ) Λt∗ (Λ̂0 ) = λNt .
2

2

Λ0
Λ̂0
Λ0
∗
0
Thus, λ̂N̂t > λNt for all t > t∗ and hence pΛ̂
t > pt for all t > t . This implies Wt∗ > Wt∗ . But

this is a contradiction, because we have
Λ0
Λ0
0
WtΛ̂∗ 0 = 2pΛ̂
t∗ − 1 = 2pt∗ − 1 = Wt∗ .

This proves that limt↑t∗ λNt < limt↓t∗ λNt . But then,
lim∗ λ̂N̂t = lim∗ λ̂N̂t = lim∗ λNt < lim∗ λNt .
t↓t

t↑t

t↑t

t↓t

Thus, there exists some ν > 0 such that λ̂N̂t < λNt for all t ∈ [t∗ , t∗ + ν). Together with the fact
Λ̂0
Λ0
Λ̂0
∗ ∗
0
that pΛ
t∗ = pt∗ , this implies that pt > pt for all t ∈ (t , t + ν), proving the second bullet.
Λ̂0
0
Finally, for the third bullet, observe first that there exists some t > t∗ such that pΛ
t = pt .
0
0
If not, then by continuity of beliefs pΛ
> pΛ̂
for all t > t∗ , and we have WtΛ̂∗ 0 < WtΛ∗ 0 , again
t
t

Λ̂0
∗
0
contradicting WtΛ̂∗ 0 = WtΛ∗ 0 = 2pt∗ − 1 . Then t := sup{s ∈ (t∗ , t) : pΛ
s > ps } exists, with t > t
´
´
t
t
0
by the second bullet point. Further, by continuity, pΛ
= ptΛ̂0 , which implies 0 λNs ds = 0 λ̂N̂s ds.
t

This yields Λt < Λ̂t . But this implies that λ̂N̂t > λNt for all t > t: Indeed, if t ≥ t∗2 (Λ̂0 ), this
is obvious. If t ∈ (t∗ , t∗2 (Λ̂0 )), then we must have λNs < λ̂N̂s for some s < t, which implies that
λNs0 < λ̂N̂s0 for all s0 ∈ (s, t∗2 (Λ̂0 )), because N is strictly decreasing and N̂ is strictly increasing on
this domain. To see that we also have λNs0 < λ̂N̂s0 for all s0 ≥ t∗2 (Λ̂0 ), note that from the above
pΛ̂∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

> pΛ∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

,

which as above implies that
Λ̂t∗ (Λ̂0 ) = Λ∗ (pΛ̂∗0
2

t2 (Λ̂0 )

) > Λ∗ (pΛ∗0

t2 (Λ̂0 )

) > Λt∗ (Λ̂0 ) .
2

Λ0
0
Hence, λ̂N̂t > λNt for all t > t. Thus, in either case we get that pΛ̂
t > pt for all t > t, as claimed
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by the third bullet.

B.3.3

Proof of part (iii) (slowdown in adoption)

We consider good and bad products separately.
Adoption of Good Products: Recall that by Lemma B.1, t∗1 (Λ0 ) = t∗1 (Λ̂0 ) =: t∗1 and λNt =
λ̂N̂t for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗ ), where t∗ := t∗2 (Λ0 ). Then for all t < t∗
λNt
Nt
λ̂N̂t
λ̂N̂t
N̂t
=
=
≥
=
,
ˆ
Λ0
Λ0
N̄0
Λ̂0
N̄
0
with strict inequality for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗ ). Therefore, At (Λ0 , G) ≥ At (Λ̂0 , G) for all t < t∗ , with strict
inequality for all t ∈ (t∗1 , t∗ ).
Finally note that for all t ≥ t∗ , Nt = ρN̄t and so:
∗)

= At∗ (Λ0 , G) + 1 − e−ρ(t−t



(1 − At∗ (Λ0 , G))



∗
At (Λ̂0 , G) ≤ At∗ (Λ̂0 , G) + 1 − e−ρ(t−t ) 1 − At∗ (Λ̂0 , G)
At (Λ0 , G)

where the second inequality follows from feasibility. But because At∗ (Λ0 , G) > At∗ (Λ̂0 , G), it follows
that At (Λ0 , G) > At (Λ̂0 , G) for all t > t∗1 , as claimed.
Adoption of Bad Products: Recall that At (λ, N̄0 , B) denotes the expected proportion of
adopters at time t conditional on θ = B, that is, letting Nt≥0 denote the associated equilibrium
ˆt
(ε + λNτ ) e−

At (λ, N̄0 , B) :=

´τ
0


(ε+λNs )ds 

0

ˆt
=
0

ˆτ
0


ˆt
´
Ns
Ns 
− 0t (ε+λNs )ds
ds dτ + e
ds
N̄0
N̄0
0

Nτ − ´ τ (ε+λNs )ds
e 0
dτ,
N̄0

where the final equality follows from integration by parts. Moreover, from the Markovian description
of equilibrium in Equation (4), it is easy to see that this expression depends on λ and N̄0 only through
Λ0 = λN̄0 , so we can denote it by At (Λ0 , B). Then we can assume without loss of generality that
Λ0 and Λ̂0 are of the form Λ0 = λN̄0 and Λ̂0 = λ̂N̄0 , i.e., that the two environments have the same
underlying population size N̄0 .
Let Nt≥0 and N̂t≥0 be the equilibrium under λ and λ̂, respectively. Given an arbitrary strictly
positive adoption flow Ms≥0 and t > 0, note that the map
ˆt
Mτ e−

λ 7→

´τ

0

7

0

(ε+λMs )ds

dτ

is strictly decreasing in λ. Note that since Λ̂0 > Λ0 > Λ0 , we have t∗1 (Λ0 ) = t∗1 (Λ̂0 ) =: t∗1 , and so we
get that for all t > 0,
ˆt
Nτ e−

ˆt

´τ

(ε+λNs )ds

0

Nτ e −

dτ ≥

´τ
0

(ε+λ̂Ns )ds dτ,

(13)

0

0

with strict inequality for all t > t∗1 . We now show that
ˆt
Nτ e−

´τ
0

(ε+λ̂Ns )ds dτ ≥

0

ˆt

´τ

N̂τ e−

0

(ε+λ̂N̂s )ds dτ

0

which together with (13) implies the desired conclusion that At (λ̂N̄0 , B) ≤ At (λN̄0 , B) for all t > 0,
with strict inequality for all t > t∗1 .
To prove this, suppose for a contradiction that there exists some t > 0 such that
ˆt
−

Nτ e

´τ
0

(ε+λ̂Ns )ds

ˆt
N̂τ e−

dτ <

´τ
0

(ε+λ̂N̂s )ds dτ.

(14)

0

0

Note that by the above result for good products, N̄0 Aτ (λ, G) =

´τ
0

Ns ds ≥

´τ
0

N̂s ds = N̄0 Aτ (λ̂, G)

for all τ ≥ 0 and so
ˆt
εe

−

´τ

0 (ε+λ̂Ns )ds dτ ≤

ˆt
εe−

´τ
0

(ε+λ̂N̂s )ds dτ

(15)

0

0

for all t ≥ 0. Inequalities (14) and (15) together imply:
ˆt 



−

ε + λ̂Nτ e

´τ

0 (ε+λ̂Ns )ds dτ <

0

ˆt 

 ´τ
ε + λ̂N̂τ e− 0 (ε+λ̂N̂s )ds dτ.

0

But this is equivalent to


which contradicts

B.4

´t
0

 

´t
´t
1 − e− 0 (ε+λ̂Ns )ds < 1 − e− 0 (ε+λ̂N̂s )ds ,

Ns ds ≥

´t
0

N̂s ds. This completes the proof of part (iii) of Proposition 1.



Comparative Statics under Bad News without Partial Adoption

Suppose learning is via bad news. This section considers the effect of increased opportunities for
social learning when there is no partial adoption. As in Lemma 2, impose Conditions 1 and 2, and
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assume that p0 ∈ (0, p] ). Then by Lemma 2, there is no partial adoption whenever Λ0 ≤ Λ0 :=
max{Λ∗ (p0 ), Λ∗ (p)}. The following result shows that, in contrast with Proposition 1, there is no
saturation effect: Increased opportunities for social learning lead to strict welfare gains, speed up
learning at all times, and reduce the adoption of bad products, while leaving the adoption of good
products unchanged.
Proposition B.1. Consider bad news learning and impose the same assumptions as in Lemma 2.
Fix Λ0 < Λ̂0 ≤ Λ0 . Then:
(i). W0 (Λ̂0 ) > W0 (Λ0 ).
Moreover, if additionally Λ̂0 < Λ∗ (p0 ),33 then
Λ̂0
0
(ii). pΛ
t < pt for all t > 0.

(iii). At (Λ0 , G) = At (Λ̂0 , G) and At (Λ0 , B) > At (Λ̂0 , B) for all t > 0.

B.4.1

Proof of part (i) of Proposition B.1

Denote Λ10 := Λ0 and Λ20 := Λ̂0 , with corresponding cutoff times ti1 and ti2 , value to waiting Wti , and
no-news posteriors pit for i = 1, 2. By Lemma 2, we have ti1 = ti2 =: ti . Let t̂ := min{t1 , t2 }. Then
note that for all t ≤ t̂, p1t̂ = p2t̂ and Λit̂ = Λi0 . By Lemma A.7 this implies that either 0 = t1 = t2 or
t1 < t2 . If 0 = t1 = t2 , then for all t > 0, we have 2pit − 1 > Wti and
pit =

p0
p0 + (1 − p0 )e−(εt+(1−e

−ρt )Λi )
0

.

Thus, p1t < p2t for all t > 0 which implies that W01 < W02 .
If t1 < t2 , then by definition of the cutoff times
Wt21 > 2p2t1 − 1 = 2p1t1 − 1 ≥ Wt11 .
Since there is no adoption until t1 , we have
W0i = e−rt
which again implies that W01 < W02 , as required.

1

pt1 i
W 1,
p0 t


33
If Λ0 > Λ̂0 > Λ∗ (p0 ), then equilibrium dynamics under Λ̂0 start off in region (II) of Figure 2, i.e.,
initially all consumers delay and then all adopt upon their first opportunity from time t∗1 (Λ̂0 ) on. In this
case, t∗1 (Λ̂0 ) > t∗1 (Λ0 )), so that initially, learning and adoption are weakly slower under Λ̂0 than under Λ0
(even though ex-ante welfare is higher under Λ̂0 ).
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B.4.2

Proof of part (ii) of Proposition B.1

Suppose Λ0 < Λ̂0 < Λ∗ (p0 ). Then Lemma A.7 implies that t∗i (Λ0 ) = t∗i (Λ̂0 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2. But
then for all t,
ptΛ0 =

p0
,
p0 + (1 − p0 )e−(εt+(1−e−ρt )Λ0 )

0
and similarly for Λ̂0 , which implies ptΛ0 < pΛ̂
t .

B.4.3



Proof of part (iii) of Proposition B.1

Adoption of Good Products: Since t∗i (Λ0 ) = t∗i (Λ̂0 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, all consumers adopt upon
their first opportunity at all times absent breakdowns. Thus, conditional on a good product, we get
At (Λ0 , G) = At (Λ̂0 , G) = 1 − e−ρt for all t.
Adoption of Bad Products: Since t∗i (Λ0 ) = t∗i (Λ̂0 ) = 0 for i = 1, 2, this follows from the same


argument as in part (iii) of Proposition 1.

B.5

Comparative Statics under Good News

Suppose learning is via good news. Consider the effect of increasing the potential for social learning
Λ0 . Under good news, there is no partial adoption. Correspondingly, the following result shows
that, in contrast with Proposition 1, there is no saturation effect:34
Proposition B.1. Consider learning via good news. Fix r, ρ > 0, ε ≥ 0, and p0 ∈ (p∗ , 1).35 Suppose
Λ̂0 > Λ0 ≥ 0. Then:
(i). Strict Welfare Gains: Provided ε > 0, we have W0 (Λ̂0 ) > W0 (Λ0 ).36
(ii). Learning Speeds Up:
• 0 < t∗ (Λ̂0 ) < t∗ (Λ0 )
Λ0
0
• pΛ̂
t < pt for all t > 0

• pΛ̂∗0

t (Λ̂0 )+k

0
= pΛ
t∗ (Λ0 )+k for all k ≥ 0.

(iii). No Initial Slow-Down in Adoption:
• For all t ≤ t∗ (Λ̂0 ), At (Λ̂0 ; θ) = At (Λ0 ; θ) = 1 − e−ρt for θ = B, G.
34
Nevertheless, equilibrium behavior is not in general socially optimal, because p∗ exceeds the socially
optimal cutoff posterior. See Frick and Ishii (2014), sections 3.1 and 6.3.3.
(ε+r)(r+ρ)
35
Recall that p∗ := 2(ε+r)(r+ρ)−ερ
is the equilibrium cutoff posterior under good news. If p0 ≤ p∗ , then all
consumers rely entirely on the exogenous news source
 from the beginning, so the potential for social learning
is irrelevant. If ε = 0, we assume that p0 1 + e−Λ0 < 1 so that t∗ (Λ0 ) < ∞.
36
Increasing Λ0 can increase welfare only if there are histories at which consumers’ preference for adoption
or delay is affected by information obtained via social learning. If ε = 0, then consumers are (weakly) willing
to adopt at all histories, since the equilibrium posterior always remains weakly above 12 . Thus, in this case
W (Λ0 ) = W (Λ̂0 ).
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B.5.1

Proof of part (i) of Proposition B.1

If p0 > p∗ and ε > 0, then under both Λ0 and Λ̂0 consumers adopt immediately upon the first
opportunity until p∗ is reached and from then on delay adoption until there has been a breakthrough.
Moreover, the probability π ∗ of a breakthrough occurring prior to p∗ being reached is the same
under both Λ0 and Λ̂0 : π ∗ =

p0 −p∗
1−p∗ .

Because learning occurs at the same exogenous rate ε once

p∗

is reached, the continuation value W ∗ conditional on p∗ being reached is also the same: W ∗ =
´
∞
ρ
p∗ 0 εe−(ε+r)t r+ρ
dt = 2p∗ − 1. So the only difference is that conditional on no breakthroughs, the

time t∗ at which p∗ is reached occurs earlier under Λ̂0 . To see that this is strictly beneficial, note
that W0 is composed of the following two terms:

 ρ
∗
(2p0 − 1)
W0 (Λ0 ) = 1 − e−(r+ρ)t (Λ0 )
r+ρ


∗ ρ
−(r+ρ)t∗ (Λ0 )
∗
∗
π
+e
+ (1 − π ) W ,
r+ρ
and similarly for Λ̂0 . The first term represents the case when a consumer receives an adoption
opportunity prior to time t∗ , and the second represents the case when a consumer’s first adoption
opportunity occurs after t∗ . Conditional on either of these cases occurring, the expected payoff
∗

is the same under both Λ0 and Λ̂0 , but the time-discounted probability e−(r+ρ)t with which the
second case occurs is strictly greater under Λ̂0 . This is strictly beneficial, because the expected
payoff in the second case is strictly greater:



ρ
ρ
∗
∗
π
+ (1 − π ) (2p − 1) −
(2p0 − 1)
r+ρ
r+ρ
r
=
(1 − π ∗ ) (2p∗ − 1) > 0. 
r+ρ

B.5.2

∗

Proof of part (ii) of Proposition B.1

If p0 > p∗ , then conditional on no breakthroughs, all consumers adopt immediately upon an opportunity until the time t∗ at which the cutoff posterior p∗ is reached. By Theorem 2, we have that
(ε+r)(ρ+r)
2(ε+ρ)(ε+r)−ερ is indeΛ0
0
t∗ (Λ0 ) and that pΛ̂
t < pt

for all t < min{t∗ (Λ̂0 ), t∗ (Λ0 )}, λNt = ρe−ρt Λ0 < ρe−ρt Λ̂0 = λ̂N̂t . Since p∗ =
pendent of the potential for social learning, this implies that t∗ (Λ̂0 ) <

for all t > 0. Moreover, once the cutoff posterior is reached, information is generated at the constant exogenous rate ε, which means that conditional on t > t∗ , beliefs depend only on t − t∗ , as


summarized in the third bullet point.

B.5.3

Proof of part (iii) of Proposition B.1

From Section B.5.2, t∗ (Λ̂0 ) < t∗ (Λ0 ). Thus, at all times t ≤ t∗ (Λ̂0 ), all consumers adopt upon the


first opportunity in both equilibria.
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B.6

Proof of Proposition 2

We first establish the following lemma:
Lemma B.2. Suppose t > t∗ ≥ 0 and consider f, g : [0, ∞) → R such that f (τ ) = g(τ ) for all
´∞
τ ≤ t∗ , f (τ ) < g(τ ) for τ ∈ (t∗ , t), and f (τ ) > g(τ ) for all τ > t. Suppose that 0 e−rτ f (τ )dτ =
´ ∞ −rτ
g(τ )dτ for some r > 0. Then for all r̂ > r,
0 e
ˆ∞

ˆ∞
−r̂τ

e

e−r̂τ g(τ )dτ.

f (τ )dτ <

0

0

Proof. We have
ˆ∞
e−rτ (g(τ ) − f (τ ))dτ

0=
0

ˆ∞

ˆt
e

=

−r̂τ (r̂−r)τ

e

e−r̂τ e(r̂−r)τ (g(τ ) − f (τ )) dτ

(g(τ ) − f (τ )) dτ +

0

t



ˆt
ˆ∞


< e(r̂−r)t  e−r̂τ (g(τ ) − f (τ ))dτ + e−r̂τ (g(τ ) − f (τ )) dτ 
0

t

ˆ∞
e−r̂τ (g(τ ) − f (τ )) dτ.

< e(r̂−r)t
0

This implies that

´∞
0

e−r̂τ f (τ )dτ <

´∞
0

e−r̂τ g(τ )dτ , as claimed.


ρ+r

To prove Proposition 2, fix ε = 0, 0 < rp < ri , ρ > 0, N̄0p > 0 and p0 ∈ ( 21 , ρ+2rpp ). By Lemma 2,
there exists λ̄p such that the equilibrium with only patient types features initial partial adoption
whenever λ > λ̄p . Consider λ̂ > λ > λ̄p . The following lemma derives the equilibrium of the game
with a small enough mass of impatient types:
Lemma B.3. There exists η > 0 such that whenever N̄0i < η, the unique equilibrium for γ ∈ {λ, λ̂}
takes the following form: There exists some t∗ (γ) such that the equilibrium flows N i and N p of
impatient and patient adopters satisfy:
Nti = ρN̄ti for all t,

 rp (2pt −1) − ρN̄ i
t
p
γ(1−pt )
Nt =
ρN̄ p
t

if t < t∗ (γ)
if t ≥ t∗ (γ).

Proof. Fix γ ∈ {λ, λ̂}. Pick η > 0 sufficiently small that p0 >
consisting only of mass

N̄0p

η+rp
η+2rp .

Consider first the game

consumers of type rp (and no consumers of type ri ). If there were an

12

exogenous news source in this game which generated signals at rate ε ≤ η, then by Theorem 1 type
rp would always weakly prefer to adopt absent breakdowns. Then it is easy to see that in the game
with no exogenous news source but with mass N̄0i < η of types ri , type rp will also always weakly
prefer to adopt. This implies that type ri must always strictly prefer to adopt.
Thus, Nti = ρN̄ti for all t. Given this, the game reduces to one in which patient types view
the information generated by the impatient types as a non-stationary exogenous news source which
generates signals at rate εt = γρN̄ti . Modifying the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1, there must
exist some t∗ (γ) > 0 such that rp is indifferent between adoption and delay for t ≤ t∗ (γ), and rp
strictly prefers to adopt at all times t > t∗ (γ). Then the unique equilibrium can be derived in the


same manner as in the proof of Theorem 1.

Given Lemma B.3, we can follow the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 to show that
t∗ (λ)

< t∗ (λ̂) and that there exists some t > t∗ (λ) such that

λ̂


= pt

pλt > pλ̂t



< pλ̂
t

if t ≤ t∗ (λ)
if t ∈ (t∗ (λ), t)
if t > t.

Note that the ex ante expected payoff of type rk (k ∈ {p, i}) under arrival rate γ ∈ {λ, λ̂} is
ˆ∞
W0k (γ)

ρe−(rk +ρ)τ

=

p0
(2pγτ − 1) dτ.
pγτ

0

Since rp is initially indifferent between adoption and delay under both λ and λ̂, we have W0p (λ) =
W0p (λ̂) = 2p0 − 1. Thus, Lemma B.2 yields W0i (λ) > W0i (λ̂). This completes the proof of Proposi

tion 2.
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